Letter to Adolf Hitler, August 27, 1940

Rome, August 27, 1940

Führer,

We have not had an opportunity to exchange ideas since our discussion of June 18th. I consider it opportune to tell you what I think of the situation at this moment.

As regards the Danube Basin and the Balkans, there has been no change in the agreed upon policy, which is to keep that zone outside the conflict. The measures of a military character on the Greek and Yugoslav borders are simply of a precautionary character, prompted by the fact that both countries are deeply hostile to the Axis and ready to stab it in the back if a favorable occasion should present itself. In the environs of Trieste the Italian police have discovered no less than five large weapons depots, hidden by Serbian partisans.

Furthermore, it is not unknown to you that both Greece and Yugoslavia have almost completely mobilized their armed forces, and there can be no doubt concerning the effective, continuous and verified complicity of Greece with Great Britain. All Greek ports are bases against us.

That said, barring any unforeseen developments, it is not in that region, but rather toward Egypt that I intend to direct the Italian military effort within the near future. The preparations are now completed and we are approaching a season more favorable for combat and for the march across the desert. Marshal Graziani has already received the order to attack on the same day when your Army attacks Great Britain. Despite the difficulties of terrain and climate, I believe we will defeat the English forces as well as the Egyptian forces if — as seems likely — they should join the English.

And now permit me a tour d'horizon.

France. — I am sure that you have not failed to notice the extraordinary psychological phenomenon, so typical of the indomitable pride of the French, that France does not consider herself conquered. Vichy France is counting on English resistance and American intervention. What is happening in North Africa indicates the intentions of the French Government. It is therefore necessary to remain watchful and impose such peace terms as will render it innocuous for several generations at least.

United States. — Unless a complete reversal occurs — always possible in a country of such genuine hysterics as America, with its little politicians — the possibility of American intervention ought to be calculated as a reality of tomorrow, especially if Roosevelt is re-elected, as seems probable. Roosevelt will be unable to make a contribution in men, but he will give greater material assistance, especially aircraft. This is happening already, and so even that possibility cannot prevent Great Britain's defeat.

Japan. — I have not yet seen the results of the "new course" of Japanese policy. The Japanese, although they are most clear in their aims, are very slow and mysterious in their methods. I think that the policy of the Axis in Tokyo ought to be to "ease tension" in Russo-Japanese relations and on the other hand to "increase tension" to the maximum between Japan and the United States.

Returning again to military matters, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what joy Italian sailors and aviators are preparing themselves to act alongside their German comrades against Great Britain.

Accept, Führer, my always cordial and comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

P. S. — As regards the harvest in Italy: The harvest has yielded 700,000 tons less grain than last year, but was extraordinarily good in regard to corn, rice, potatoes, beans, sugar beets, fruit, and green fodder. We are therefore not excessively concerned about our food supply..

Lettera al Capo dello Stato spagnolo Francisco Franco, 25 agosto 1940

Roma, 25 agosto 1940-XVIII

Caro Franco,

Vi ringrazio della lettera che mi avete mandato e nella quale mi prospettate la situazione della Spagna nella attuale fase della guerra.

Mi piace di dichiararvi subito che la Vostra lettera non mi ha sorpreso.

Ho sempre pensato, sino dallo scoppio della guerra, che la "Vostra" Spagna, cioe la Spagna della Rivoluzione falangista, non avrebbe potuto restare neutrale sino alla fine, e che dalla neutralita. sarebbe, al momento opportuno, passata alla non belligeranza e finalmente, all'intervento.

Se questo non accadesse, la Spagna si estranierebbe dalla storia europea, sopratutto dalla storia di domani che sará. determinata dalle due Potenze vittoriose dell'Asse. Inoltre non avrebbe titoli morali per risolvere i suoi problemi africani e, lasciatemelo dire, una Rivoluzione trionfante deve porsi degli obiettivi esterni, di carattere internazionale, cioe, gli obiettivi che in un determinato momento concentrano la totale attenzione e lo sforzo completo di un popolo.

Mi rendo conto che dopo tre anni di guerra civile, la Spagna avrebbe bisogno di un lungo periodo di calma; ma gli eventi non lo consentono e la Vostra situazione economica interna non peggiorera. se Voi passerete dalla non-belligeranza all'intervento.

Desidero dirvi, caro Franco, che io con queste mie obiettive consideración non intendo minimamente sollecitarvi a prendere le Vostre decisioni. Sono ben certo che le Vostre decisioni saranno, come sempre, inspirate dalla difesa degli interessi fondamentali del Vostro popolo, e sono altresi certo che Voi non lascerete passare questa occasione per dare alla Spagna il suo spazio vitale africano.

Nessun dubbio che — dopo la Francia — sará battuta la Gran Bretagna. Il regime inglese vive oramai di un solo elemento: la menzogna.

Non ho bisogno di dirvi che per quanta riguarda le Vostre aspirazioni, Voi potete contare sulla piena solidarietá dell'ltalia fascista.

Vi prego, caro Franco, di accogliere i miei piú cordiali camerateschi saluti.

MUSSOLINI

Letter to Francisco Franco, August 25, 1940

The Chief of Government and Duce of Fascism
To the Head of the Spanish Government
Generalissimo Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde

Rome, August 25, 1940

Dear Franco!

I thank you for the letter which you have sent me, and in which you sketch the position of Spain in the present stage of the war.

I should like to make it clear to you at once, that your letter has not surprised me.

Ever since the outbreak of the war I have been constantly of the opinion that “your” Spain, the Spain of the Falange Revolution, could not remain neutral until the end of the war, but at the right moment would change to non-belligerency and finally to intervention.

Should that not happen, Spain would alienate herself from European history, especially the history of the future, which the two victorious Axis powers will determine.

Furthermore, she would have no moral justification for the solution of her African questions, and, let me say to you, a victorious revolution must set itself extreme goals of an international type, such goals, therefore, as can, at a given moment, require the complete attention and the total effort of a people.

It is clear to me that Spain, after three years of civil war, needed a long period of recuperation, but events will not permit it, and your domestic economic condition will not get worse when you change from non-belligerency to intervention.

I should like to say to you, dear Franco, that I, with these my practical considerations, do not wish to hasten you in the least in the decision that you have to make, for I am sure that in your decisions you will proceed on the basis of the protection of the vital interests of your people and I am just as certain that you will not let this opportunity go by of giving Spain her African lebensraum.

There is no doubt that after France, Great Britain will be defeated; the British regime exists only on one single element: the lie.

I certainly do not need to tell you that you, in your aspirations, can count on the full solidarity of Fascist Italy.

I beg you, dear Franco, to accept my most cordial and comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

The above letter was written in response to the following letter by Francisco Franco:

To His Excellency

Senor Benito Mussolini

Head of the Italian Government Italy

Madrid, August 15, 1940

Dear Duce,

Since the beginning of the present conflict, it has been our intention to make the greatest efforts in our preparations, in order to enter the foreign war at a favorable opportunity in proportion to the means at our disposal, since the lack of the most vital provisions and the interruption of communications with Italy and Germany hindered every operation at the moment.

The rapid and devastating victories in Flanders altered the situation; the defeat of France liberated our frontiers, lessening the grave tension which we along with our Moroccans have been bearing since our Civil War.

From this moment, our horizon became brighter, our operation became possible and could become very effective, once the difficulties of provisioning have been removed.

In this manner, upon the entry of your Nation into the war, we had to take a clearer stand, one of alertness, changing to one of non-belligerency, which, in the field of foreign affairs, could not fail to have great repercussions. This awakened jealousy and opposition, and unleashed an Anglo-American offensive against our provisioning, aggravated in these days by the new measures taken by the United States against our exports, and by the English blockade measures, causing grave tension in our relations with those countries.

The consequences, which the conquest of France is to have for the reorganization of the North African territories have made it advisable for me, now that the time has come, to charge my Ambassador in Rome with transmitting to Your Excellency the Spanish aspirations and claims traditionally maintained throughout our history in the foreign policy of Spain, today more alive than ever in our consciousness; to territories, whose present administration is a consequence of that Franco-English policy of domination and exploitation, of which Italy also bears so many scars. To the legitimate Spanish aspirations are added in this case the requirements for security necessitating the elimination of a weak and thinly protected frontier, and the assuring of our communications with the Canary Island group.

In this manner, Spain in addition to the contribution which she made to the establishment of the New Order, through our years of hard struggle, offers another in preparing herself to take her place in the struggle against the common enemies.

In this sense, we have requested from Germany the necessities for action, while we push forward the preparations and make every effort to better the provisioning situation as far as possible.

For all these reasons, you will understand the urgency in writing you, to ask your solidarity in these aspirations for the achievement of our security and greatness, while I at the same time assure you of our unconditional support for your expansion and your future.

With my greatest admiration for the brave Italian comrades who are fighting so gloriously, I send you my most cordial regards.

F. FRANCO

Lettera a Sua Altezza Reale Imperiale Umberto di Savoia, 2 luglio 1940

Roma, 2 luglio 1940-XVIII

Altezza,

tornato a Roma, desidero rinnovarvi l'espressione del mio profondo compiacimento per la disciplina, il comportamento, il morale delle truppe che voi comandate.

Le Divisioni e i reparti che ho avuto la fortuna di passare in rassegna, si sono presentati in un modo che, senza ombra di esagerazione rettorica, si può definire superbo.

Gli italiani e gli stranieri devono sapere che nei giorni 21, 22, 23 e 24 combatteva quella che sarà chiamata la «Battaglia del fronte Alpino occidentale», impegnata s'una estensione di 200 chilometri, a quote fra i 2000 e i 3000 metri, in mezzo a incessanti tormente di neve.

Gli italiani e gli stranieri devono sapere che dal Piccolo San Bernardo al fiume Roia il primo sistema della Maginot è crollato sotto l'assalto delle fanterie italiane che lo hanno sfondato per una profondità tra gli 8 e i 32 chilometri.

Gli italiani e gli stranieri devono sapere che i francesi annidati nelle caverne, muniti di cannoni di ogni specie, hanno resistito accanitamente sino all'ultimo, sino cioè all'armistizio e anche alcune ore dopo, poichè, fra l'altro, erano stati tenuti letteralmente allo scuro di quanto era accaduto nel resto della Francia.

Gli italiani e gli stranieri devono sapere che gli stessi francesi sono rimasti attoniti davanti alla tenacia, all'impeto e allo sprezzo — veramente sovrano — del pericolo, dimostrato dalle fanterie italiane, d'ogni corpo, e dalle artiglierie. I battaglioni del genio sono stati efficaci collaboratori dell'assalto.

Gli italiani e gli stranieri devono sapere che la battaglia è stata dura e sanguinosa. Migliaia di uomini fuori combattimento lo testimoniano. Com'è nella regola del Regime, saranno pubblicati gli elenchi dei Caduti. Quanto ai feriti, che ho visitato negli ospedali, dico che è difficile trovare nel mondo un'altra razza la quale, davanti alle più crudeli lacerazioni della carne, dimostri — come l'italiana — tanta calma e tanto stoicismo.

Altezza, scrivendovi a visita ultimata, ho creduto che non si dovesse ulteriormente tardare a precisare questi dati di fatto che già appartengono alla storia e accrescono il patrimonio di gloria dell'Esercito italiano.

La Patria può essere fiera di questi suoi figli in armi, temprati nel cuore e nei muscoli da venti anni di Fascismo.

MUSSOLINI

Letter to Prince Umberto of Savoy, July 2, 1940

Rome, July 2, 1940

Highness,

Having returned to Rome, I wish to again express to you my deep satisfaction with the discipline, behavior and morale of the troops under your command.

The Divisions and units which I had the good fortune of reviewing presented themselves in a way that, without a shadow of rhetorical exaggeration, can be defined as superb.

Italians and foreigners should know that on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th they fought what will be called the "Battle of the Western Alps", engaged across an extension of 200 kilometers, at altitudes between 2000 and 3000 meters high, in the midst of incessant snowstorms.

Italians and foreigners should know that from the Little St. Bernard Pass to the Roia River the first system of the Maginot Line collapsed under the onslaught of Italian infantry who broke through it, to a depth between 8 and 32 kilometers.

Italians and foreigners should know that the French nestled in the caves, equipped with cannons of every kind, resisted fiercely until the end that is to say until the Armistice and even a few hours after, since, among other things they had been literally kept in the dark about what had happened in the rest of France.

Italians and foreigners should know that the French themselves were astonished at the tenacity, impetus and contempt in the face of danger shown by the Italian infantry, by the corps and by the artillery. The engineer battalions were effective collaborators of the assault.

Italians and foreigners should know that the battle was been hard and bloody. The thousands of men put out of action testify to this. As is the rule of the Regime, the lists of the Fallen will be published. As for the wounded, whom I visited in the hospitals, I must say that it is difficult to find another race in the world which shows so much calm and so much stoicism in the face of the most cruel lacerations of the flesh like the Italians do.

Highness, I am writing to you at the end of the visit because I believe we should not delay in highlighting these facts which already belong to history and which increase the glory of the Italian Army.

The Fatherland can be proud of these its sons-in-arms, hardened in heart and in muscle by twenty years of Fascism.

MUSSOLINI