By Benito Mussolini
This report is written, for it must remain in the records of the Grand Council, as the document is a guide for Italian foreign policy in the short term, long term, and very long term.
The premise from which I argue is the following: States are more or less independent according to their maritime position. In other words, states that possess coasts on the oceans or have free access to the oceans are independent. States that cannot communicate freely with the oceans and are enclosed in inland seas are semi-independent. States that are absolutely continental and have outlets neither on the oceans nor on inland seas are not independent. Italy belongs to the second category of states. It is bathed by a landlocked sea that communicates with the oceans through the Suez Canal, an artificial link easily blocked even by improvised methods, and through the straits of Gibraltar, dominated by the cannons of Great Britain.
Italy therefore does not have free connection with the oceans. Italy is therefore in truth a prisoner of the Mediterranean, and the more populous and prosperous Italy becomes, the more its imprisonment will gall.
The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, Cyprus. The sentinels of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez. Corsica is a pistol pointed at the heart of Italy; Tunisia at Sicily; while Malta and Cyprus constitute a threat to all our positions in the eastern and western Mediterranean. Greece, Turkey and Egypt have been ready to form a chain with Great Britain and complete the politico-military encirclement of Italy. Greece, Turkey and Egypt must be considered virtual enemies of Italy and of its expansion. From this situation, whose geographical rigour leaps to one's eyes and which tormented, even before our regime, those men who saw beyond considerations of momentary political expediency, one can draw the following conclusions:
1. The task of Italian policy, which cannot have and does not have continental objectives of a European territorial nature except Albania, is to first of all break the bars of the prison.
2. Once the bars are broken, Italian policy can have only one watchword—to march to the ocean.
Which ocean? The Indian Ocean, joining Libya with Ethiopia through the Sudan, or the Atlantic, through French North Africa.
In either case, we will find ourselves confronted with Anglo-French opposition. To confront the solution to such a problem without having our backs protected on the continent is absurd. The policy of the Rome-Berlin Axis therefore corresponds with a historical necessity of fundamental importance. Thus also our approach to the Spanish Civil War.
These premises may seem distant, but they bring me directly to the day of November 30, 1938, the demonstration of the Fascist Chamber. After Munich, the propaganda of our opponents both at home and abroad had made these following allegations: 1) that the real architect of peace was Chamberlain; 2) that Italy only pretended to mobilize, but did not actually mobilize; 3) that the Axis had once again functioned exclusively in favour of Germany. This last point of insinuation was most widespread in France.
The three foregoing propositions are false, and the last proposition especially is false. In 'Le Figaro' on January 13, 1939, the writer Lucien Romier, one of the best, set the record straight:
"They all say," he writes, "that Germany is politically indebted to Italy. Let's go over accounts. Germany has annexed Austria and dismantled Czechoslovakia. It was aided by the Italian absentation in Central Europe and the barrier of protection which was secured by Italy south of the Danube countries, the Alps, the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. But on the other hand, Italy was able to withstand the sanctions and quickly conquer Ethiopia, thanks to Germany. If Germany, as she had been asked by England, had applied sanctions to Italy, the outcome of the Italian enterprise would be more than doubtful. Likewise, thanks to the pressure of the Axis, i.e. Germany, Italy's conquest was recognized and the policy of Eden was substituted with the policy of Chamberlain."However, since a policy must take into account the states of mind, even if not justified by the logic of facts, especially for the reasons which I have outlined in the first portion of my report, I give order to the Party to commence moving in the Mediterranean waters, to begin popularizing the issues which seemed to be set aside, but in fact had not been set aside by the Government, as will be demonstrated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his report on the activities in Corsica and in Tunisia by our official organs and by our cells.
The meeting of November 30
An authoritarian and totalitarian regime, i.e. one without parties of opposition, must have the courage of self-criticism. After the unexpected event of November 30—an event which was in the air, but which could have been conducted differently had it been prearranged—you have to weigh the balance of assets and liabilities. Among our liabilities are the following:
1) The demonstration of the Chamber took away our cushion, indeed ushered into second order all the work carried out by Italy before and during Munich;
2) The demonstration sent out an alarm; something which was necessary to avoid, politically and militarily, which resulted in the consequent measures in Corsica, Tunisia and Djibouti;
3) The demands were not entirely intone. Now we need a Fascist foreign policy, and to establish this axiom: all that is on this side of the Alps belongs to us, all that is beyond the Alps is not ours. This applies to Savoy. Regarding the question of Nice, it is a matter of making a modest correction of the border for a city now completely Frenchified;
4) On the very day when—via the general strike—the crisis of French politics seemed to reach its climax, the demonstration of the Fascist deputies immediately gave a twist to the situation and a new "sacred union" was re-established against Italy. However, we must not believe that this "sacred union" will last forever in a country like France. In fact, in Le Petit Bleu on January 19 we read the following about parliamentary confusion and inconsistency: "All were united yesterday to oppose the Italian claims; and today they begin insults and divisions on the issue of Spain." But there remains a union against Italy;
5) The demonstration made on the eve of the visit of Ribbentrop could give the impression that it was a gesture of spite for the Franco-German agreement, which I had approved since October and which was referred to as "a great farce";
6) The demonstration puts in danger the visit of Chamberlain to Rome, a visit which is desirable for reasons all too obvious;
7) The demonstration resulted in the visit of Daladier to Corsica and to Tunisia, as well as a glorification of French neo-imperialism;
8) We gave the world the impression that our conquest of the Empire had disappointed us.
The assets are the following: 1) The settling of our Mediterranean problem in the face of the world, even though most of the world is against us. Significant in this regard is the article of Duff Cooper; 2) The end of francophilia based on the myth of being "Latin sisters", thanks to the bloody insults that the French press has made against our armed forces; and 3) The growing popularity of the Axis thanks to the attitude of solidarity of the press in Berlin and thanks to the declarations of the Führer.
December 17
The demonstration of the Chamber did not engage the Government, but the Fascist Government could not ignore it. On December 17, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Ambassador of France, in which he stated: "not to enter into force" the conventions of Mussolini-Laval in January 1935.
Our argument is, from a strictly legal point of view, unassailable. None of the terms of those agreements have been applied: they have decayed. With the note of December 1 the Fascist Government became the diplomatic "point" of the situation, but at the same time recognized the limits of our aspirations, aspirations which are not metropolitan, but colonial, namely Tunisia, Djibouti, Suez. France replied almost with a "fin de non recevoir", arguing the opposite of us. Since then no contacts have been made, nor will any be made before the end of the war in Spain, as was stated in a more formal manner to Chamberlain.
What do we want?
Although Corsica can not—according to the note of December 17—be part of the negotiations, and while Corsica, admittedly, is now deeply Frenchified, we can not give it up because in addition to being geographically, historically, ethnically and linguistically Italian, it also represents for us a vital strategic interest. The modus procedendi may be the following: 1) revive the autonomist tendencies of Corsica; 2) strive for the independence of Corsica; 3) annexation to Italy.
Tunisia
Claims of a territorial nature towards Tunisia could not be advanced without the full agreement of the Arab world. 1) Thus, the Statute of the Italians in Tunisia; 2) substitute France with Italy in a protectorate of the Bey.
Djibouti
With regard to Djibouti, there is more room for negotiations, especially since Britain would not have to fear changes in the status quo of the Mediterranean. Here we can obtain more than rail and port facilities, transfers of a territorial nature, but it remains to be seen whether or not the eventual compensation to be given to France will be excessive.
Foreseeable developments
Italy can choose one or the other of the following roads:
a) Do not give further course to the matter and await better times; placing everything in a general arrangement of events which will not be long. In other words, bury the question. But after so much clamor, such a solution would be considered a bad strategic retreat, a backtracking equivalent to diplomatic defeat. Fascists and non-Fascists might conclude from this that all it took was for France to find itself a bit of "bite" in order to suffocate "in its germ" the natural aspirations of the Italian people.
b) Negotiate, taking as a starting point the Italian note of December 17—that is, the Statute of the Italians of Tunisia, Italian interests of a rail and port nature in Somalia, tariffs of the Suez Canal, a few border adjustments. An agreement of this kind would not be ideal, but presented conveniently to the Italian people, it would ultimately be approved, also because of the fact that it would alienate potential complications.
c) Present, at an opportune time, our maximum program to France. Here there are only two possibilities. Either France agrees to dialogue and the ground remains open for diplomacy, or France rejects any proposal and there will be recourse to arms.
Characters of a Franco-Italian War
There is no doubt that a test of strength will one day come between us and France, especially due to the fact that France only respects those people whom she has been beaten by. It is a matter of knowing whether the time is right. Let us examine the characteristics that a war between Italy and France could take. From the point of view of the Alps, there is no possibility for a decision. The Alps are too difficult for us to pass, and just as difficult for the French. In Libya our defensive preparations do not allow them to hope for a decision on that front. The only land front where French forces could be overwhelmed is in Somalia, although today it is already not as easy as it was before. A Franco-Italian war, then, would assume an air-sea character. Here we could be if not superior, at least equal in strength. Such a war could last very long unless other factors intervene to accelerate it, and assuming it does not take on a European or global character.
Can we count on Germanic solidarity? After the speech of the Führer, it can not be doubted.
Are we today, in February 1939, in an "ideal" condition to have a war? No State is ever in an "ideal" condition for a war, if by this it is meant a mathematical assurance of victory. Every war—even the best prepared—has its unknowns. But there is no doubt that our preparation will be better in a few years, namely:
a) when we have renewed all our artillery (1941-42);
b) when we have in service 8 battleships and perhaps double the existing number of submarines (1941-42);
c) when the Empire is entirely peaceful, self-sufficient, and capable of providing us with an indigenous army;
d) when we will have achieved at least 50% of our autarkic plans;
e) when we have held the Exhibition at the close of 1942, which should reinforce our reserves;
f) when we have repatriated the largest possible number of Italians from France; these 600,000 to 700,000 Italians living in France constitute a very grave problem.
In the present state of affairs, Fascist diplomacy will work to obtain the best solution mentioned in the second option, and at the same time the armed forces will hasten their preparations in order to be prepared to face any event.
