(Published in Il Popolo d'Italia, July 31, 1935)
By Benito Mussolini
Some reasons which have been put forward for the Italo-Ethiopian conflict by the Italian press—in order to refute those alleged in the foreign press—are of secondary importance upon which it is unnecessary to dwell.
That slavery exists in Ethiopia, i.e. the buying and selling of human beings, is admitted by the Negus himself. That this trade takes atrocious forms is documented in a thousand reports, mostly carried out by the English, the latest being published in 1932. That Ethiopia, upon entering the League of Nations, had solemnly promised to abolish slavery, is also true. And the fact that Ethiopia has done nothing about it is also acknowledged everywhere, including in London.
That being said, it must immediately be added that abolishing the slave trade is not the reason why Italy has militarily pepared her colonies in East Africa. The abolition of slavery is not our objective, although it will certainly be a logical consequence of our policy.
[...]
Another non-essential motive: that of race. Firstly, Ethiopians still do not consider themselves Negroes, but Semites. Secondly, there are tens of thousands of Negroes who fight as soldiers under the Italian flag and who have always fought magnificently for us and with us. This can be said too of the Arabs, some of whom are organizing an 'Arab Youth of the Littorio.' We Fascists acknowledge the existence of races, their differences and their hierarchy. But this does not mean that we present ourselves to the world as the embodiment of the White race in a war against other races; and we do not intend to make ourselves the preachers of exclusivism and racial hatred, when we see that our fiercest critics are not the Negroes of Harlem—who could profitably use their time to take care of their colleagues who are daily and Christianly lynched in the United States—but are mostly genuine Whites in Europe and America.
Similarly, the theme of 'civilization' should not be overemphasized. The spread of civilization in its twofold moral and material aspect is also not our objective, although it will be a consequence of our policy.
Our essential motives, absolutely irrefutable and enough to put an end to any attempt to censure us, are twofold: 1) the vital needs of the Italian people and 2) our military security in Eastern Africa. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs himself explicitly admitted the first point. But the second point is the decisive one.
In 1928 Italy signed a treaty of friendship with the Ethiopian government. Almost immediately afterwards, under the protection of this treaty, Ethiopia began the reorganization of its army. Who was entrusted with the task of reorganizing it? Perhaps it was entrusted to Italian officers, with whom Ethiopia had signed a treaty of friendship? No. The chief reorganizer is a Swedish general, together with Belgian officials and instructors.
The whole orientation of the preparation is anti-Italian. In 1931, a regional mobilization in the Ogaden suddenly concentrated tens of thousands of Ethiopians on the Italian border: the same happened in 1911 and during the Great War.
It is blindingly obvious that the strategic situation of our colonies, precarious enough in normal times, would become untenable in exceptional times, if ever Italy was to become a player on the chessboard of Europe.
The solution of the problem must be a totalitarian one. An expansion that is not guarded by weapons, a protectorate that is not accompanied by military measures, can end up like that of Uccialli. On the other hand, until the looming Abyssinian military threat is eliminated, the entire security of our colonies will remain uncertain. Only Italy can judge the limits of this security: in cases of danger we would not have any kind of help from anyone; indeed, the opposite is most probable.
Posed in military terms, the Italo-Abyssinian problem is one of striking simplicity, of an absolute logic; posed in military terms, the problem only admits one solution—with Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva.
All the other reasons are important, but not decisive: it is in this last fact that the policy of Fascist Italy finds its supreme historical and human justification.
