By Benito Mussolini
Honourable Senators,—The speech that I have the honour of delivering before your illustrious Assembly may appear analytical, because in it I propose to touch on several questions and to speak decisively upon several problems, especially with regard to internal policy. By this I do not delude myself to be able to convince those who are my opponents in mala fide, nor to disperse completely the small opposition which nourishes itself on detail, and is the effect of personal temperament.
You will not be surprised if I begin with foreign policy, even if it happens that this is the field in which serious and founded opposition does not exist, and it may be legitimately said that our policy is endorsed unanimously by the nation.
As I have already said on other occasions, the foreign policy of the present Government is inspired by the necessity for a progressive revaluation of our diplomatic and political position in Europe and in the world. It is a fact that, except for territorial acquisitions bounded by the Brenner and the Nevoso, frontiers wrested by long and bloody wars, Italy was excluded in the Peace of Versailles and other successive treaties from all other benefits of an economic and colonial nature. Solemn pacts signed during the war have lapsed and have not been replaced. The position of inferiority assigned to Italy has weighed and still weighs heavily on the economic life of our people. It is useless to dwell upon recriminations of the past. We must rather seek to regain the ground and time lost. There is no doubt that from October to today the situation has notably improved.
The other Powers, whether allied or not, know that Italy intends to follow an energetic and assiduous policy for the protection of her natural and vital interests, intends to be present wherever, directly or indirectly, they are at stake, because this is her right and her definite duty; but at the same time she is in favour of that line of conduct in general policy which tends to bring back as quickly as possible to a normal state the economic situation of our continent. Italy, who too is marching rapidly towards her readjustment, sees this rebirth continually disturbed by general outside factors. There is, therefore, a definite Italian interest in hastening the pacific solution of the European crisis.
The Position of Italy and Reparations. All such crises, since the Treaty of Versailles onwards, have been dominated by the one problem: Reparations. In the face of this problem the fundamental position of Italy is as follows:
- Germany can and must pay a sum which now seems universally fixed and which is very far from the many hundreds of milliards talked of on the morrow of the Armistice;
- Italy could not tolerate territorial changes which would lead to a political, economic or military hegemony in Europe;
- Italy is prepared to bear her quota of sacrifice, if it is necessary to obtain what is called European reconstruction;
- The Italian Government maintains to-day more than ever, above all after the last German Note, that the problem of reparations and that of Inter-Allied debts are intimately connected and are in a certain sense interdependent.
It will not be inopportune to recall, considering the rapidity of events, that the French and Belgians went to the Ruhr on account of the declarations of a series of failures of the supplies in kind by Germany, admitted also by England, at any rate as regards that of wood, and the failure of the Conference of Paris.
It is certainly worth while to fix exactly in their essential lines the main features of the Italian, English and German projects, in order to have a picture of the situation as regards its agreements and divergencies, and to see what conjectures we can for as to a possible settlement. This will also serve to explain why Italy was not able to accept the Bonar Law scheme at Paris, and why she had to reject the recent Cuno-Rosenberg Memorandum.
The Italian project reduced the German debt to fifty milliards of gold marks, proposed a moratorium of two years, during which Germany would continue the supply of reparations in kind, accepted the distribution of German payments according to the quotas fixed at Spa, by which the Italian quota was put at five milliards of gold marks, fixed the payment of one part of the "C" bonds by means of the security given by the other ex-enemy States, used the remainder of the "C" bonds to settle the debt to America, agreed to the taking of economic pledges as a guarantee of the German payments, and finally, as regards the payments of the reparations owed by Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, asked for a pledge for the acceptance of the proposals which England had deferred putting forward—proposals, that is, of annulling those debts.
The Italian quota of reparations, which the Italian project fixed at five milliards of gold marks, was thus reduced in the English project to less than half; whilst cancelling the bonds, it partly abolishes to our detriment German solidary responsibility for minor ex-enemy debts and rendered impossible the execution of the agreement of March 1921, which ensures important advantages to Italy upon the basis of the "C" bonds. The larger percentage reserved on the seventeen milliards, representing the interest of the moratorium capitalised to 1923, could not be used for the payment of American debts, in consideration of the aleatory nature of these seventeen milliards.
I do not recall all this to reopen discussions, but only to make clear the main outlines of that which was and remains a noteworthy attempt to find a solution for this grave problem; an attempt which contains worthy elements which can be usefully taken up again in case of a definite settlement.
The conclusion of an agreement between England and America on the problem of debts—the work of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Baldwin, today Prime Minister, followed shortly after the presentation of the English project.
Any idea of this debt being itself cancelled, or even of a simple compensation through the payment of reparations, is excluded from this agreement. The obligation to pay, although facilities may be accorded concerning both the number of years in which it must take place and the interests due, is solemnly affirmed and put into execution. In England the Speech from the Throne strongly emphasized this agreement. Even taking into account the diversity of economic strength and the totality of sacrifices borne, it could not remain without effect upon the importance of the whole question for the other European Powers.
Analysts of the German Project. If we compare the English and Italian projects with the German, the inacceptability of the latter appears evident. As is known, one of the fundamental points of the last German project concerns the consolidation of the actual debt of Germany, especially in kind, at the figure of twenty milliard gold marks, with an additional ten milliards, the payment of which depends upon the decision of an International Commission. Deducting the interest, these twenty milliards are reduced to fifteen, and the sums necessary must be found by international loans; and in the very probable eventuality that by 1927 the twenty milliards have not been subscribed, an annuity will be paid which represents five per cent, interest plus one per cent, for the redemption of the loan. Finally, in the German project any provision or regulation for the guarantees demanded is lacking. The total German debt, which in the English and the Italian projects is fixed at the figure of fifty milliards, in the German project is reduced to less than a third, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in it the Italian quota and the sacrifice demanded from Italy.
In view of the representations, especially of England and Italy, Germany has recognized her proposals as insufficient, and yesterday the German Ambassador, Neurath, presented to me the new German Note, on the contents and nature of which I cannot pronounce an opinion for evident reasons, as in consequence of this Note diplomatic action with all the Allies must be taken up. I will only say that the German Note no longer demands the preliminary evacuation of the Ruhr as a condition for negotiation.
This might make us believe in a renunciation on the part of Germany of that passive resistance, the utility of which—even for German aims—appears ever more doubtful, and whose cessation would help towards a more rapid attainment of a solution.
Italy and Hungary. But the problem of reparations is not only Franco-German, it is also Hungarian, Bulgarian and Austrian.
It is useful to define the stage which has been reached with regard to these ex-enemy countries. The total of the Hungarian reparations, which is fixed by the Treaty of Trianon, has not yet been determined by the Reparations Commission, and Hungary up to to-day has only furnished limited supplies in kind. The Hungarian Government, alleging the disturbed economic and financial conditions of the country caused by the serious depression of the krone, has recently put forward the necessity to contract a foreign loan, which, if it is to succeed, should be guaranteed by the custom duties, by the tobacco monopoly, and, if needs be, by other resources. Hence arises the necessity for such resources to be freed for an adequate period from the claims of reparations. A Memorandum precisely to this effect has been recently presented by the Hungarian Minister in Paris to the Reparations Commission.
The Italian Government, having examined the question from a technical point of view, has deemed it indispensable to concede to Hungary the temporary relinquishment of certain resources, so that she may proceed to her own economic restoration by means of loans to be contracted abroad. Italy has, therefore, shown herself favorable to the above Hungarian request, with the addition of certain conditions necessary to guarantee her own rights, on which point she is in agreement with the British Government.
Agreement with Bulgaria for Payment. With reference to Bulgarian reparations, Italy, Great Britain and France came to an agreement on 21st March with the Bulgarian Government to facilitate the payment of her debt of 2250 million gold francs fixed by the Treaty of Neuilly, by dividing it in two parts; one of 550 millions to be paid by installments beginning in October of this year, and the other 1700 millions not to be claimed before thirty years.
Bulgaria has pledged herself by this agreement to reserve for the regulation of her debt the revenues of her customs and has already passed a law to this effect. The agreement has also been approved by the Reparations Commission, with the reservation of our rights for the reimbursement of the expenses of the army of occupation. In fact, negotiations are proceeding with the Bulgarian Government for the regulation of this credit, which enjoys the privilege of priority over other reparations.
Our Government, animated by favorable dispositions as regards all that concerns the settlement of obligations arising from the war, has had no difficulty in accepting such an agreement.
The Loan to Austria. Fulfilling the pledge taken by its predecessors in the Protocol of Geneva of 4th October 1922, the Italian Government has co-operated with the Governments which are signatories of the Protocol, in order that the loan in favor of Austria should have a large and ready success. For this purpose the Government has consented to postpone for twenty years, which is the duration of the War Loan, her credits against Austria for the recovery of damages and for bonds of food supply, has given her own guarantee for twenty-five per cent, of a maximum loan of 585 million gold kronen, and has authorized Italian banks to contribute directly to the loan up to the maximum of 200 million lire, including the sixty-eight which Italy had previously lent to Austria, and which, by the terms of the Protocol of Geneva, should have been repaid in cash.
Putting off for a further period the exaction of Austrian reparation, and giving a guarantee and a direct and substantial contribution to the loan in favor of Austria, the Italian Government has wished to offer her co-operation towards the political independence and territorial integrity of the Austrian Republic to which the Protocol of Geneva refers, and to which the United States of America also wish to contribute, confidently subscribing for the first time to a European loan.
Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy's political line of conduct towards the States of the Little Entente and in general towards the States recently created is substantially inspired by the necessity of exacting the respect and the scrupulous fulfillment of the treaties, because, given the present contingencies, only such a policy can produce quick and pleasing results with regard to an economic settlement of the Danubian States which would contribute to the larger one of Central Europe. On several occasions the friendly and moderate policy of Italy has followed such a course with satisfactory results.
With reference to such a policy the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia have a special importance. The clear attitude taken by the Government with regard to Yugoslavia by proceeding to the definite enforcement of the Treaty of Rapallo has strengthened our legal position, and we are able to rest any further development of our policy on a solid basis. The enforcement of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which has been necessarily labourious owing to the large extent of the field covered, can be said, however, to proceed on the whole satisfactorily. In spite of the initial difficulties encountered in any exceptional regime, the economic system of the so-called "special zone of Zara" is already in force for the evacuation of the remaining Dalmatian territories, and the various organizations for the regulation of all the intricate questions arising out of the Agreements have been constituted.
Fiume. But naturally the most important question to solve is that of Fiume. As is known, it offers the gravest difficulties, since, in order to ensure the future of the commercial life of the town, there must be solved many complex problems of an economic nature which are often in opposition to those of a political character. Undoubtedly the recent long Parliamentary crisis in Yugoslavia, which for a considerable time forced the Government of Belgrade to confine its attentions almost exclusively to internal problems, has heavily weighed against the rapidity of the solution of such a question.
That Government has repeatedly acquainted us with its wishes to solve the question in a satisfactory way as regards the sentiments and the interests of Italy, and has also frankly made known to us the real difficulties with which the Government is faced in asking the populations interested to accept a solution in agreement with the Italian point of view.
Italo-Yugoslav Commission. With a view to ensure an atmosphere of greater quiet to the Italo-Yugoslav Comission, the Government of Belgrade has, in the meantime, agreed to transfer the seat of the Commission to Rome. The Yugoslav Delegation has arrived, and between it and the Italian Delegation, which is fulfilling its duty with a high sense of patriotism and political probity, preliminary meetings are taking place with the object of fixing certain fundamental points before resuming official discussions, so that the latter may proceed with the necessary speed without lapsing into a deplorable stagnation, which would be otherwise inevitable in such an arduous task.
The Conference of Lausanne and the definite Cession of Castelrosso to Italy. The Conference of Lausanne, which after the well-known suspension of last February resumed its proceedings on 23rd April, is slowly completing them through the no small difficulties of various kinds caused by the delicacy and complexity of the questions under examination. The course followed by the Italian Delegation under any circumstance has always been inspired by the most calm and impartial attitude, and its efficacy has been recognized and generally appreciated at its just worth.
Italy cannot help considering as her vital interests the speedy restoration of a normal state of trade in the East, as well as the economic development and general progress of all the peoples living on the shore of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Although all the questions under discussion have not yet been solved at Lausanne, on some of them, however, which more directly affect our country, an agreement, satisfactory on the whole, has been reached. The Government of Angora has explicitly withdrawn the objection regarding the cession of the island of Castelrosso to Italy, the possession of which on our part could in no way justify an eventual suspicion of Italian aggressive aims with regard to Turkey. Our flag, which has already been saluted from the moment it appeared in the island as a symbol of peaceful well-being, will in the future continue to protect a population which by plebiscite has entrusted itself to us.
The Juridical Protection of Foreigners in Turkey. The Italian Government has also obtained the cancellation of those clauses, with regard to our colonies in North Africa, which the agreements concluded after the Libyan War had left in existence, and at the same time the interests of Libyan subjects residing in Turkey, whose rights have been equal to those of Italian citizens, were opportunely protected.
From the opening of the Conference the question of the juridical protection of foreigners has been of the greatest importance. The Conference has agreed in fixing the limits of such protection, including it in a formula which establishes for a period of five years the appointment on the part of the Turkish Government of foreign judges, who are authorized to receive complaints of the sentences and of the proceedings of Turkish magistrates.
At Lausanne there still remain under discussion certain important questions of general interest, such as those relative to the management of the Ottoman Public Debt and others of an economic nature, which I hope may be quickly solved.
Relations between Italy and Russia. The present relations with Russia are regulated by the Italo-Russian and Italo-Ukraine Agreements of 26th December 1921. A few days ago the projects for the conversion into law of the Royal Decree of 31st January 1922 were presented to Parliament, by whom the said agreements had been approved, though some opposition had been offered to their practical application. This opposition gave the Russians a pretext for violating the agreement. We mean to remove these obstacles in order to render easier the economic relations between the two countries and pave the way for an understanding resting on a wider basis without excessive illusions, but also without dangerous prejudices.
Relations between the two countries, which possess different economic systems, present enormous difficulties. They are, however, not unsurmountable if on both sides there is a good will to overcome them. Italian policy towards Russia is clear and cannot give rise to misunderstanding.
The presentation before Parliament of these decrees represents another proof of our intentions and gives us the right to expect from the Government of Moscow the scrupulous fulfillment of the pacts, the execution of the pledge taken to abstain from any act hostile to our Government, and from whatsoever direct or indirect propaganda against the institutions of the kingdom.
Relations between Italy and the United States. I do not think it is necessary, considering the brevity of this speech, to enter into further detail. I will only say that the relations between the United States and Italy are particularly cordial, and I am glad to add that both the Government and the American people have fully understood the new political situation in Italy.
Relations with Poland and other Countries. The initiative of Italy for the definite determination of the Polish frontiers has cemented even more closely the bonds of cordial friendship which have united the two countries for centuries. Their collaboration continues to be strengthened on economic as well as on political grounds. In these last days the Polish Government has placed important orders with Italian manufacturers.
The conversations and the personal relations I have had with the Ministers of Austria, of Roumania, of Hungary, the recent journey of H.M. the King of England, the commercial treaties concluded and to be concluded, are other signs of that progressive revaluation of our diplomatic position which I referred to at the beginning of this speech.
Improvement of the Diplomatic and Consular Services. The Fascist Government, always with the object of this revaluation, as soon as it came into power instructed its representatives abroad to direct their policy outside the confines of the country to the renewed life of Italy, and to face immediately the problem of the means and the men for that end. In fact, the administration of Foreign Affairs, in the face of so many difficulties from outside, already possessed a great difficulty in her own constitution, due to the scanty number of its elements. The tools of our work, which is so delicate abroad, had to be renewed, and rendered suitable, as regards the increase in number of officials and the new conditions of Italy, for the momentous task which they are required to perform.
Instructions have, therefore, been given with effect from the first days of November for the reorganization of the competition for the Diplomatic and Consular Services, and for Interpreters.
In conclusion I wish to repeat that Italian foreign policy, while it intends to safeguard national interests, wants at the same time to constitute a factor of equilibrium and peace in Europe, and by such a policy I think I interpret the tendencies and the needs of the Italian people.
THE INTERNAL POLICY
The problems of public order are problems of the authority of the State. There is no real authority in the State if public order is not perfectly normal. Public order and authority of the State are, therefore, two aspects of the same problem. I ask you if conditions have improved or become worse since last October. ("Improved!") Some of you give an affirmative answer. I, too, say they have improved. Although, naturally, I am far from being pessimistic and, therefore, from being discontented, I feel that nothing ever goes well enough. But, Gentlemen, when one speaks of public order, one must make comparisons. Even if they are disagreeable, they are necessary. Unrest, uneasiness and sedition are phenomena to be found not only in Italy. If we glance beyond our frontiers we have reason to repeat that, if Messene weeps, Sparta does not laugh! Look at the vanquished peoples and note what happens in Austria and in Germany. Look at the victorious peoples and you will see that only yesterday there was a strike of public officials in Belgium, which has cost the Treasury hundreds of millions of francs. If, then, you glance at the neutral countries, at Spain, you will find there, too, that life is not excessively bright and easy. All this I say for those who, at every small revolver shot fired in one of the twenty thousand villages of Italy, think they have been wounded by a 17-inch shell!
A Significant Comparison. But, above all, it is worth while to look at Italy and consider, on one side, her conditions in the years 1918-20 and in the period following 1920-21. The dominating events of the former two years are the occupation of the factories, the permanent strike of the officials belonging to public organizations, carried out in rotation, and by a displacement of all the powers of State authority; and, although the incident is extremely painful, one must recall to mind that in the rank and file of that same glorious army of ours occurred an episode at Ancona which proves how deeply sedition had worked its way into the body of the Italian State.
The dominating event of the following two years is the punitive Fascist expedition. Fascisti, from sheer necessity, went out to the assault of the towns in large armed bodies. To-day all this is over. To-day the officials of public organizations do not and will not strike. When the Fascist employees of the Post and Telegraph Offices came to me to protest because my colleague, the Hon. Colonna di Cesaro, had punished them, I told them that if I had been Minister of Post and Telegraphs I should have punished them twice, and I added that, just because they were Fascisti, they would have to recognize the necessity for a strict discipline.
The State renewed. The conditions of public order reached their zenith of disintegration during the latter part of the year. In August there was the anti-Fascist strike, which completely paralyzed the State. This had no effect; the Fascist forces, in its stead, obtained success. And, from that time, I said that the two must be made one, and that since that State was destitute of all the attributes of virility, while there was a State in power which was rising with great strength and capable of imposing discipline on the nation, it was indispensable for the rising State to substitute itself, by a revolutionary movement, for the other State which was declining. The August anti-Fascist strike was followed by the Fascist occupation of the towns of Bologna and Bolzano. The authority of the State was a complete ruin. There are no more reports of labour conflicts in the papers now.
The Chamber and the Conflicts. I am sufficiently impartial to say that in these last days there has been a slight recrudescence of trouble. What is its cause? I tell you quite frankly: the re-opening of the Chamber. (Laughter.) The Chamber is the place of questions. By the spectacle it offers to the nation it sows seeds of conflict and discord amongst the impulsive and excitable masses.
Further, the attitude of a section of Italian Liberalism is a very welcome piece of good fortune for the subversive elements, because they constitute for them unhoped-for, unexpected allies, who blow enormous bubbles, which I promise myself to prick with the pin of logic and sincerity before closing my speech. Then perhaps there is this, that certain gentlemen, when they found out that they had not to fear the law of Fascism or that of the Government, which is slower because it is bound to move in accordance with legal procedure, resumed their bold attitude.
Elimination of the Subversive Elements. The measures adopted to restore public order are: First of all the elimination of the so-called subversive elements. There was much clamor after the hauling in of the nets, but in reality it was only a very small affair. Of two thousand who were arrested, those who are still in gaol do not reach the figure of one hundred and fifty. They are in the hands of the judges. They were elements of disorder and subversion.
On the morrow of each conflict I gave the categorical order to confiscate the largest possible number of weapons of every sort and kind. This confiscation, which continues with the utmost energy, has given satisfactory results. I had to repress every illegal act.
The High Grades of the National Militia. There was another problem with regard to the National Militia: namely the necessity of filling the superior posts, to which had to be appointed men coming from the army with a large personal military experience; this necessity had to be harmonised with the gratitude due to the small heads of Fascist "squadrismo," the body which, by leaving thousands of glorious dead, had crushed the subversive demagogic elements.
We have solved this problem. All the ranks of superior officers above those of "Seniore" have been assigned to the officers coming from the regular army; all the inferior grades and those of sub-officers have been given to military men, to "squadristi" who had previously seen military life.
Moreover, statistics are always worth more than speeches. Ninety-seven per cent, of the officers of the Militia having a rank superior to that of "Seniore" come from the officers of the regular army. Out of about two hundred and thirty officers superior to the rank of "Seniore" six are decorated with the Military Order of Savoy, two with Gold Medals, one hundred and thirty with Silver Medals, eighty with Bronze Medals.
As this is a day of explanations, even at the risk of abusing your patience, I must read the list of rewards bestowed on the Chiefs of the National Militia. General Cesare De Bono, Field Marshal of the regular army: three Silver Medals, special promotion for war services, "Croce di Guerra." General Gandolfo, Field Marshal of the regular army: two Silver Medals, special promotion for war services. Hon. Cesare Maria De Vecchi: four Silver Medals, two Bronze Medals, two "Croci di Guerra." Italo Balbo: one Silver Medal, one "Croce di Guerra." Gustavo Fara, the general well known through all Italy: one Gold Medal, two Silver Medals, special promotions for war services. Stringa, Major-General of the regular army: three Silver Medals, one Bronze Medal, disabled in the war. Ozol Clemente, Major-Genera! in the regular army: two Silver Medals, "Croce di Guerra." Ceccherini, Major-General in the regular army: three Silver Medals, two Bronze Medals. Zambon, Major-General of the regular army: Silver Medal and Bronze Medal. Guglielmotti, Major-General of the regular army: two Silver Medals.
After these follow:
Giuriati, with two Silver Medals; Acerbo, with three Silver Medals (voices: "Bravo!"); Caradonna, with three Silver Medals; Finzi, with a Silver Medal and two "Croci di Guerra."
Not to embarrass the modesty of my friends, I shall not continue to read the list of these officers of the National Militia,—(Laughter.)—but this is enough to prove to you that this is a serious institution. And I add that every day it becomes more so, because I mean that it shall be so, because all its chiefs mean it.
It might be asked of us: "Why does the Militia remain?" I shall tell it to you at once: for a very simple reason, to defend Fascism at home and also abroad. The word "abroad" might alarm you. Well, I tell you that abroad there is a difficult atmosphere for Italian Fascism. Difficult for the parties of the Right, which, being formed of national elements, cannot feel enthusiasm for a movement that exalts our national qualities; difficult for the parties of the Left, because those elements are our adversaries from the social point of view, knowing that the Fascist movement is clearly anti-Socialist. It is well, therefore, that it should be known that there is in Italy a mighty army of volunteers to defend that special form of political organization called Fascism.
The Militia, moreover, has the object of enabling the army to do its own work. The army must fight, must get ready for war. It must not do police work, especially of a political nature, except under absolutely exceptional circumstances, of which now I do not wish to think, even hypothetically. As an example I can tell you that last night, upon my personal instructions, a whole section of Leghorn was blockaded. Well, one hundred carabineers and three hundred black shirts sufficed, whilst the army, the official troops, were sleeping peacefully in their barracks, as was their duty and their right. Moreover, believe me, so long as in Italy they know that, besides some tens of thousands of faithful carabineers, there is this enormous force, attempts at revolt or at sedition will never be dared.
Modifications to the Statute Law. Finally, and this is a maneuver of the last few days, have burst forth in Italy the bold defenders of the Statute, of Liberty and of Parliament. (Laughter.) It seems, listening to these gentlemen, who had for a long time forgotten the existence of the Statute, even as a simple historical document,—(Laughter.)—that the Statute runs a serious risk and that one cannot even discuss nor examine it.
Well, I think that none of you can consider Camillo Cavour as a Bolshevist and a Fascist of 1848. Everybody knows that the Constitutional movement of Piedmont was the work of Cavour. Everybody knows how the political Constitution was granted. At Genoa a tumult arose against the Jesuits, believed supporters of Absolutism. A Commission of Genoese went to Turin and asked for the expulsion of the Jesuits and the calling out of the Civic Guard. But Cavour answered: "This is too little, the times are ripe for something more!" Cavour wrote in his paper, II Risorgimento: "The Constitution must be demanded." And this was promulgated on the 4th of March. In its preamble it says: "The Statute is the fundamental, perpetual law of the Monarchy." Four days afterwards the first Constitutional Ministry of Coalition was formed with the Moderate Balbo and the Democratic Pareto.
The phrase "The Statute is the fundamental, perpetual and irrevocable law of the Monarchy" had wounded the ears of the Democrats. Cavour hastened to interpret it in a relative sense. It is worth while to listen attentively to this paragraph of Cavour. "How is it possible," he said, "how can it be expected that the legislator would have wished to pledge himself and the nation not to make the slightest direct change, to bring the smallest improvement to a political law? But this would mean the removal from the community of the power of revising the Constitution; it would mean the deprival of the indispensable power of modifying its political form according to new social exigencies; this would be such an absurd idea that no one of those who co-operated in the making of this fundamental law could conceive it. A nation cannot renounce the power of changing by legal means its common law."
After a short time history had to register a first violation of the Statute, which assumed or presumed that, in order to become a member of Parliament, it was necessary to be an Italian citizen. On the 16th of October there was a division between the Right, amongst which there were the Moderates and the Municipals, and the Left, to which belonged the Democrats, called the "burnt heads," and the Republicans. On the following day these two parties were After a short time history had to register a first violation of the Statute, which assumed or presumed that, in order to become a member of Parliament, it was necessary to be an Italian citizen. On the 16th of October there was a division between the Right, amongst which there were the Moderates and the Municipals, and the Left, to which belonged the Democrats, called the "burnt heads," and the Republicans. On the following day these two parties were.
Nobody, Gentlemen, wishes to overthrow or destroy the Statute, which rests solidly on firm foundations; but the inhabitants of this building from 1848 up to to-day have changed. There are other exigencies, other needs. There is no longer the Piedmontese Italy of 1848! And it is very strange to notice among the defenders of the Statute those who have violated it in its fundamental laws, those who have curtailed the prerogatives of the Crown, those who wanted the Crown to be entirely outside the politics of the nation, and to become a dead institution.
The Abolition of Parliament? They say that this Government does not like the Chamber of Deputies. They say that we want to abolish Parliament and deprive it of all its essential attributes. It is timely to say that the collapse of Parliament is not desired by me, nor by those who follow my ideas. Parliamentarism has been severely affected by two phenomena typical of our days: on one side Syndicalism, on the other Journalism. Syndicalism gathers by its various organizations all those who have special interests to protect, who wish to withdraw them from the manifest incompetence of the political Assembly. Journalism represents the daily Parliament, the daily platform where men coming from the Universities, from Science, Industry, from the experience of life itself, dissect problems with a competence that is very seldom found on the Parliamentary benches.
These two phenomena typical of the last period of capitalist civilization are those which have reduced the enormous importance which was attributed to Parliament. To sum up, Parliament can no longer contain all the life of the nations, because modern life is exceptionally complicated and difficult.
But this does not mean that we wish to abolish Parliament. We wish rather to improve it, to make it more perfect, make it a serious, if possible a solemn institution. In fact, if I had wished to abolish Parliament, I would not have introduced an Electoral Reform Bill. This Bill logically presupposes the elections, and through these elections there will be deputies—(Laughter.)—who will form Parliament. In 1924, therefore, there will be a Parliament.
But must the Government be towed along by Parliament? Must it be at the mercy of Parliament? Must it be without a will, or a head before Parliament? I cannot admit that.
The Fascist Grand Council. They say that Fascism has created duplicate institutions. These duplicates do not exist. The Grand Council of Fascism is not a duplicate of the Council of Ministers or above it. It met four times and never dealt with problems which concerned the Council of Ministers. With what, then, did the Grand Council of Fascism deal? In the February meeting it devoted itself to the National Militia and Freemasonry; it paid a tribute to the Dalmatians and to the people of Fiume, and dealt with Fascism abroad. In the March meeting it arranged the ceremony for the anniversary of the foundation of Rome and dealt with Syndicalism. In its fourth meeting it devoted itself to the Congress of Turin and again to Syndicalism.
All the great problems dealing with State administration, with the re-organization of armed forces, with the reform of our judiciary circuits, with the reform of the schools, all the measures of a financial nature have been adopted directly by the responsible body, the Council of Ministers.
And then what is the Grand Council of Fascism? It is the organ of co-ordination between the responsible forces of the Government and those of Fascism. Among all the organizations created after the October revolution, the Grand Council of Fascism is the most characteristic, the most useful, the most efficient. I have abolished the High Commissioners, because they duplicated the Prefects and also embarrassed the authority of the latter, who alone have the right to wield authority. But I could never think of abolishing the Grand Council of Fascism, not even if tomorrow by chance the Council of Ministers were composed entirely of Fascists.
Our Magnanimity must not be taken advantage of! This Government, which is depicted as hostile to liberty, has been perhaps too generous. The October revolution has not been bloodless for us; we have left dozens and dozens of dead, and who would have prevented us from doing in those days that which all revolutions have done, from freeing ourselves once for all from those who, taking advantage of our magnanimity, now render our task difficult? Only the Socialists of the newspaper La Giustizia, of Milan, have had the courage to recognize that if they still exist they owe it to us, who did not wish that, in the first moments of "The March on Rome," the "black shirts" should be stained with Italian blood. But our generosity must not be taken advantage of!
Nobody must hope for a Crisis in Fascism. The Membership of Fascism. But nobody must hope for a crisis in Fascism, which is and will remain simply a formidable party. If you happen to notice that in one of its innumerable sections in Italy there is dissension, do not thus draw the conclusion that Fascism is in a state of crisis. When a party holds the Government in its hands it holds it, if it wishes to hold it, because it possesses formidable forces to use to consolidate its power with increasing strength. Fascism is a Syndicalist movement which includes one million and a half of workmen and contadini, who, I must say in their praise, are those who give me no trouble. There is, moreover, a political body which has 550,000 members, and I have asked to be relieved of at least 150,000 of these gentlemen. (Laughter.) There is, still, a military section of 300,000 "black shirts," who are only waiting to be called. These bodies are all united by a kind of moral cement, which might be called mystic and holy, and through which, by touching certain keys, we would hear to-morrow the sounds of certain trumpets!
The Associations which are included in Fascism. They ask us: "Will you then camp out in Italy as an army of enemies which oppress the remainder of the population?" Here we have the philosophy of force by consent. In the meanwhile I have the pleasure to announce that imposing masses of men who deserve all the respect of the nation have joined Fascism, such as the Association of the Maimed and the Disabled, the National Association of Ex-soldiers. In the wake of Fascism, moreover, are also included the families of the fallen in war. There are a great many members coming from the people in these three Associations, whilst there is a great solidarity amongst these disabled ex-soldiers and families of the fallen in war. They represent millions of people, and, in the face of this collaboration, must I go and simply seek all the fragments, all the relics of the old traditional parties? Must I sell my spiritual birthright for a mess of pottage which might be offered to me by those who have followed no one in the country? No! I shall never do this.
The Collaboration I welcome. If there is anybody who wishes to collaborate with me, I welcome him to my house. But if this collaborator has the air of a controlling inquisitor, or of the expectant heir, or of the man who lies in ambush, with the object of being able at a given moment to record my mistakes, then I declare that I do not want to have anything to do with this collaboration.
Besides, there is a moral force in all this. What was the cause after all which affected Italian life in past years? Italy was passing through a transformation. There were never definite limits. Nobody had the courage to be what he should have been.
There was the bourgeois who had Socialistic airs, there was the Socialist who had become a bourgeois up to his finger tips. The whole atmosphere was made up of half tones of uncertainty. Well, Fascism seizes individuals by their necks and tells them: "You must be what you are. If you are a bourgeois you must remain such. You must be proud of your class, because it has given a type to the activity of the world in the nineteenth century. If you are a Socialist you must remain such, although facing the inevitable risk you run in that profession." (Laughter.)
Taxation and the Discipline of the Italian Population. The sight which to-day the nation offers is satisfactory, because the Government exercises a stern and, if you like to say so, a cruel policy. It is compelled to dismiss by thousands its officials, judges, officers, railwaymen, dockworkers; and each dismissal represents a cause of trouble, of distress, of unrest to thousands of families. The Government has been compelled to levy taxes which unavoidably hit large sections of the population. The Italian people are disciplined, silent and calm, they work and know that there is a Government which governs, and know, above all, that if this Government hits cruelly certain sections of the Italian people, it does not do so out of caprice, but from the supreme necessity of national order.
The Government is One. Above this mass of people there are the restless groups of practicing politicians. We must speak bluntly. In Italy there were several Governments which, before the present one, always trembled before the journalist, the banker, the grand master of Freemasonry, before the head of the Popular Party, who remains more or less in the background,—and it was enough for one of these ministers in partibus to knock at the door of the Government, for the Government to be struck by sudden paralysis. Well, all this is over! Many men gave themselves airs with the old Governments; those I have not received, but have reduced them to tears. For the Government is one. It knows no other Government outside its own and watches attentively, because one must not sleep when one governs, one must not neglect facts, one must keep before one's eyes all the panorama, notice all the composition and decomposition, the changes of parties and of men. Sometimes it is necessary, as a tactical measure, to be circumspect; but political strategy, at least mine, is intransigent and absolute.
My only Ambition is to make the Italian People Strong, Prosperous, Great and Free. I should have finished; in fact I have finished, but I must still add something that concerns me a little personally. I do not deny to citizens what one might call the "Jus murmurandi''—the right of grumbling. But one must not exaggerate, nor raise bogies, nor have one's ears always open to dangers which do not exist. And, believe me, I do not get drunk with greatness. I would like, if it were possible, to get drunk with humility. I am content simply to be a Minister, nor have I ambitions which surpass the clearly defined sphere of my duties and of my responsibilities. And yet I, too, have an ambition. The more I know the Italian people, the more I bow before it. The more I come into deeper touch with the masses of the Italian people, the more I feel that they are really worthy of the respect of all the representatives of the nation. My ambition, Honorable Senators, is only one. For this it does not matter if I work fourteen or sixteen hours a day. And it would not matter if I lost my life, and I should not consider it a greater sacrifice than is due. My ambition is this: I wish to make the Italian people strong, prosperous, great and free!
(The end of the speech is hailed by a frantic and delirious ovation. All the Senators rise, and the Tribune applauds loudly, whilst the great majority of the Senators go to congratulate the Hon. Mussolini.)
