Rome, August 27, 1940
Führer,
We have not had an opportunity to exchange ideas since our discussion of June 18th. I consider it opportune to tell you what I think of the situation at this moment.
As regards the Danube Basin and the Balkans, there has been no change in the agreed upon policy, which is to keep that zone outside the conflict. The measures of a military character on the Greek and Yugoslav borders are simply of a precautionary character, prompted by the fact that both countries are deeply hostile to the Axis and ready to stab it in the back if a favorable occasion should present itself. In the environs of Trieste the Italian police have discovered no less than five large weapons depots, hidden by Serbian partisans.
Furthermore, it is not unknown to you that both Greece and Yugoslavia have almost completely mobilized their armed forces, and there can be no doubt concerning the effective, continuous and verified complicity of Greece with Great Britain. All Greek ports are bases against us.
That said, barring any unforeseen developments, it is not in that region, but rather toward Egypt that I intend to direct the Italian military effort within the near future. The preparations are now completed and we are approaching a season more favorable for combat and for the march across the desert. Marshal Graziani has already received the order to attack on the same day when your Army attacks Great Britain. Despite the difficulties of terrain and climate, I believe we will defeat the English forces as well as the Egyptian forces if — as seems likely — they should join the English.
And now permit me a tour d'horizon.
France. — I am sure that you have not failed to notice the extraordinary psychological phenomenon, so typical of the indomitable pride of the French, that France does not consider herself conquered. Vichy France is counting on English resistance and American intervention. What is happening in North Africa indicates the intentions of the French Government. It is therefore necessary to remain watchful and impose such peace terms as will render it innocuous for several generations at least.
United States. — Unless a complete reversal occurs — always possible in a country of such genuine hysterics as America, with its little politicians — the possibility of American intervention ought to be calculated as a reality of tomorrow, especially if Roosevelt is re-elected, as seems probable. Roosevelt will be unable to make a contribution in men, but he will give greater material assistance, especially aircraft. This is happening already, and so even that possibility cannot prevent Great Britain's defeat.
Japan. — I have not yet seen the results of the "new course" of Japanese policy. The Japanese, although they are most clear in their aims, are very slow and mysterious in their methods. I think that the policy of the Axis in Tokyo ought to be to "ease tension" in Russo-Japanese relations and on the other hand to "increase tension" to the maximum between Japan and the United States.
Returning again to military matters, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what joy Italian sailors and aviators are preparing themselves to act alongside their German comrades against Great Britain.
Accept, Führer, my always cordial and comradely greetings.
MUSSOLINI
P. S. — As regards the harvest in Italy: The harvest has yielded 700,000 tons less grain than last year, but was extraordinarily good in regard to corn, rice, potatoes, beans, sugar beets, fruit, and green fodder. We are therefore not excessively concerned about our food supply..
