Rocca delle Caminate, 4 ottobre 1943
Führer,
I am taking advantage of the forthcoming visit of Marshal Graziani to inform you briefly, but precisely, of the Italian situation as it appears to me since my return from Germany. It is a grave situation, and one could even say tragic. There is no need to extrapolate upon the reasons. You can easily imagine them. But more serious than the material situation is the moral one. The bulk of the population is still stunned by the events which have taken place between July 25 and September 8, and they oscillate between a will to recover and a sort of resigned fatalism.
As you know, the Republican Fascist Government held its first session and made statements of a programmatic nature that made a good impression. It is the figure of Marshal Graziani who gives a character to the Government and arouses vast hopes and sympathies.
As I had occasion to tell you, Führer, in the talks at your Headquarters, when you extended to me such a comradely hospitality after my liberation, the fundamental tasks of my government were and are:
a) to reorganize the civil life of the country so that all is quiet behind the front and every possible collaboration is offered to the German commanders;
b) to prepare the new Republican army.
On this latter point Marshal Graziani will give you a concise and accurate exposition which I am sure will attract your attention.
As to the first point, in order to reorganize the civil life of the country, the new government I formed must have the necessary autonomy to govern and give orders to the civil authorities which are subordinate to it. Without this possibility, the government has no prestige, is discredited and therefore destined to end ingloriously. This is not in the common interest; indeed this would have grave consequences and would fuel those tendencies towards the newly reconstructed government of the traitor Badoglio.
A) The German military commanders issue a continuous stream of orders on matters which concern civilian life. These orders are often contradictory from province to province. The Italian civil authorities are ignored and the population has the impression that the Fascist Republican government has no authority even in matters that are completely extraneous to the military sphere. Often the orders of the Northern Command are in contradiction with the Southern Command. I could provide extensive documentation, but it is not necessary. In the three [sic] provinces of Emilia, Piacenza, Parma and Reggio, the German military authorities have taken over the civil administration, and issued instructions that every request made by an Italian citizen must be accompanied by a German translation. In peasant provinces such as these, it is practically impossible. I must say, Führer, that a single Command would eliminate these inconveniences.
B) I also have the duty to tell you that the nomination of a High Commissioner at Innsbruck for the provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno has created a painful impression in every part of Italy. The detachment of the Italian judicial authorities of those provinces from the Court of Appeal of Venice, already ordered by the Commissioner, has raised many concerns which will not fail to be exploited by enemy propaganda (which is particularly active at this time). And the only one to profit from it will be the traitor Badoglio.
The Republican Government that I have the honor of leading has only one objective, only one desire: to ensure that Italy can once again actively participate in the war as soon as possible. But to reach this goal, it is essential that the German military authorities limit themselves to military tasks and allow Italian civil authorities to properly administer the country. They will, of course, lend their collaboration to the Germanic authorities whenever and wherever such collaboration is requested.
If these conditions are not met, then Italian public opinion and world opinion will conclude that my Government is unable to function as a government, and the government itself will become discredited and, even worse, a laughingstock.
And now, Führer, I ask you to please listen to what Marshal Graziani will tell you. His ideas are clear and above all practicable. Also in this field it is necessary to leave to Marshal Graziani and to his collaborators Admiral Legnani and Colonel Botto of the Air Force the task of gathering and framing the forces wishing to return to fight under the Axis banners. And above all we must give credit to these men who burned the vessels behind them and who are convinced soldiers of the new Republican State and sincere friends of Nationalist Socialist Germany.
So many times you have been kindly interested in my health. Overall it is not bad, except for my eyesight which is progressively weakening.
Please, Führer, accept the expression of my faithful camaraderie together with my most cordial greetings.
MUSSOLINI
Military Note.
Although I do not know the plans of the German High Command, I would like to stress — as I did to your Headquarters — the necessity of keeping Rome in our hands.
Coming after the abandonment of Naples, the loss of Rome would have immense repercussions in Italy and in the world from the politico-military point of view.
From the military point of view, the fall of Rome would leave the enemy in possession of all the airfields of central Italy, which are thirty in number. This would facilitate not only the bombing of central and southeastern Germany, but also attacks on the Danube Basin and the Balkans.
It would be a great fortune if we could hold the line that we fixed at your Headquarters, namely the Monte Circeo-Maiella Line, at least for the duration of the winter.
