Rocca delle Caminate, October 19, 1940
Führer,
After our meeting at the Brenner on October 4, I reflected very carefully on some of the problems that were the subject of our examination, and I arrived at several conclusions that I have a duty to communicate to you.
France. Our informants and even more so—I think—yours, are unanimous in affirming that the French hate the Axis more than before; that Vichy and De Gaulle have split the parties; and that the French do not consider themselves beaten, because—they say—they did not want to fight in the first place. Vichy is in contact with London via Lisbon. They, at least the vast majority of them, are hoping that the United States will intervene and ensure the victory of Great Britain. With this kind of stimmung (sentiment) one can not rely on their collaboration. Nor should we seek it. If we do, then the French—after having denied their defeat—would believe and make others believe that our victory over Great Britain would be due to them and them alone, and they would try to leave us with the bill. Thus, the idea of French adherence to an anti-English continental bloc has been discarded. I believe, however, that the time has come to establish the metropolitan and colonial physiognomy of tomorrow's France, reduced—as you justly desire—to proportions that will prevent it from starting to dream of expansions and hegemonies.
The population. The 1936 census showed 41,950,000 inhabitants in France, of whom 2,700,000 were foreigners and 2,300,000 were naturalized citizens of recent or remote date. There are 5 million non-French. Of the 850,000 Italians, who form the largest single mass of foreigners, I would repatriate 500 per day and hope to reach a total of at least 500,000 in a year. I calculate that your territories and my acquisitions will take away another 4 million inhabitants from France. The peace treaty therefore should and will reduce France to a population of 34-35 million inhabitants, which will tend to decrease even further because I believe that the demographic recovery of the French people is quite improbable.
As regards the metropolitan and colonial acquisitions claimed by Italy, they are, as I have told you, very modest: they are limited to Nice, Corsica and Tunisia. I do not count Somalia because it is a classic desert. These are the requests that could have been discussed even before the war if Daladier's stubbornness had not caused him to reply with his "jamais", and which were proposed to me—as a basis for discussion—in return for the maintenance of Italy's non-belligerency.
If then the financial and economic questions incident to the war are taken care of, Italy does not have any nor will she advance any further demands in regard to France. The problem now is to see if one can consider the time opportune for such a clarification of the relations between the Axis and France. And on this essential point I will be very pleased to know your opinion.
English positions on the Continent. I believe that in the event of a prolongation of the war, you will agree with me that it is essential to disrupt the surviving British positions on the European continent. This disruption is another condition for victory. They are as follows: Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Switzerland.
As regards Portugal, its attitude is neutralized by Spain.
We ought have no illusions regarding the true stimmung (sentiment) of Yugoslavia towards the Axis: it is irreducibly hostile. I am enclosing a report from my Police that demonstrates the neutrality violations and criminal activity of Yugoslavia against Italy. Yugoslavia is a bad neighbor with a bad conscience. She cannot live as she is now. The Serbs and Croats today are farther apart than ever. Maček's experiment has failed completely. For the moment I do not intend to modify Italy's attitude toward Yugoslavia, which is one of watchful vigilance.
As regards Greece, I am resolved to end the delays, and very soon. Greece is one of the main points of English maritime strategy in the Mediterranean. The King is English, the political classes are pro-English, and the people are immature but trained to hate Italy. Greece has ordered the mobilization of her armed forces and, as early as last May, has made air and naval bases available to Great Britain, as is revealed by the documents which von Ribbentrop has had the kindness to send me after the discovery at Vitry la Charite. English officials have recently taken virtual possession of all airfields in Greece. In short, Greece is to the Mediterranean what Norway was to the North Sea, and must not escape the same fate.
I believe that Turkey, another pawn in the English game, will not move if you should, as you certainly will, augment your occupation forces in Romania.
As regards Egypt, the resumption of operations is dependent on a formidable effort of logistical preparation, comparable to the one you had to carry out in preparation for the landing in Great Britain. In any event, I hope I shall be able to launch operations simultaneously on the Greek and on the Egyptian front. Following the conclusion of this second phase of the offensive, which will seize the strong point of Mersa Matruh (230 km. from Alexandria), it remains to face the decisive battle of the Delta. It is for this phase that it is necessary to take under consideration the support by your armored forces. General Toma, who has gone to Cyrenaica, will report to you.
I feel sure that you will experience no surprise in seeing Switzerland included among the remaining continental positions of Great Britain. By her incomprehensible attitude of hostility, Switzerland herself poses the problem of her existence.
I should now like to say a word with respect to Spain. The taking over of the conduct of foreign affairs by Sufier affords us assurance that the tendencies hostile to the Axis are eliminated or at least neutralized. On the other hand, I do not feel that the internal economic situation has improved. Again I express my conviction that Spanish non-belligerence is more advantageous to us than her intervention. We ought to keep intervention as a reserve; it is a card that we ought to play at the most opportune moment in accordance with the given circumstances, such as prolongation of the war through 1941 or an overt intervention of the United States. Meanwhile Spain will have the time necessary to prepare herself.
I have written you a long letter contrary to all my habits, but I could not refrain from passing in review for you my thoughts on the numerous questions which were the subject of our meeting at the Brenner.
I beg you, Führer, to believe sincerely in my comradely friendship, which our common trials and experiences render ever more profound, and to accept my most cordial regards.
MUSSOLINI
