May 30, 1939
Now that the Alliance between Italy and Germany has been secured and will be fully applied at all times according to the letter and spirit of the Treaty, I consider it appropriate to set down my views on the present situation and the way it will probably develop in the future.
1. War between the plutocratic and therefore self-seeking conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations is inevitable. Given this premise, we must prepare.
2. Through the strategic positions acquired in Bohemia and Albania the Axis Powers have in their hands a fundamental factor for success.
3. In a memorandum addressed to Herr von Ribbentrop at the time of the meeting in Milan, I explained the reasons why Italy needs a period of preparation, which may extend until the end of 1942. The reasons are as follows:
The two European Axis Powers require a period of peace of not less than three years. It is only from 1943 onwards that a war effort may have the greatest chances of victory. A period of peace is necessary for Italy for the following reasons:
a) For the military organization of Libya and Albania, and for the pacification of Ethiopia, from which an army of half a million men must be formed;For all these reasons, Fascist Italy does not wish to hasten a European war, although she is convinced of the inevitability of such a war. It may also be assumed that within three years Japan will have brought her war with China to an end.
b) To complete the construction and renovation of the six battleships, which has already commenced;
c) For the renewal of all our medium and heavy caliber artillery;
d) To further develop our plans for autarky, through which any attempt at a blockade by the capitalist democracies should be thwarted;
e) To carry out the World Exhibition in 1942, which, in addition to documenting the twenty years' activity of the Fascist regime, may also provide us with foreign exchange reserves;
f) To effectuate the repatriation of Italians from France, which constitutes a very serious military and moral problem;
g) To complete the transfer, which has already begun, of a large number of war industries from the Po Valley to southern Italy;
h) To further deepen the relations not only between the governments of the Axis Powers, but also between the peoples. For this purpose, a detente in the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and National Socialism would doubtless be beneficial, and is also greatly desired by the Vatican.
It is foreseeable that the London-Paris-Moscow triangle will seek — in peacetime — to damage the Axis Powers in all ways possible, especially economically and morally. Our response in the economic sphere will be to develop the autarkic plans to the utmost, and in the moral sphere to counter-attack on all sides.
4. In addition to acts of true and proper material sabotage — assassinations, etc. —, every effort should be made to disrupt the internal unity of the enemies by fostering anti-semitic movements, by supporting pacifist movements (such as Paul Faure in France), by promoting regional autonomy (Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, Ireland), by accelerating moral disintegration and by inciting the colonial peoples to revolt.
The entry of Bolshevik Russia into the West, with London leading her by the hand, is undoubtedly a factor conducive to the development of these plans.
5. From the strategic point of view, the Western nations should be regarded as 'walled in', i.e. practically unassailable by land forces. Consequently, a mutual defense position should be provided for on the Rhine, in the Alps and in Libya. On the other hand, the metropolitan and colonial forces in Ethiopia can initiate offensive operations against the neighbouring French and British colonies.
The war in the West would thus assume a predominantly air and naval character. Italy's naval problem has been made considerably easier by the conquest of Albania. The Adriatic has become an inland sea which can be hermetically sealed.
6. The war can only assume a dynamic character towards the East and South East. Poland and other guaranteed States will have to rely on themselves and can be paralyzed before any concrete assistance is rendered them, even from neighbouring Russia.
7. The war for which the great Democracies are preparing is a war of attrition. We must therefore proceed from the grimmest hypothesis, which is one hundred percent probable. The Axis will not receive anything from the rest of the world. This hypothesis would be grave, but the strategic positions secured by the Axis have considerably reduced the gravity and danger of a war of attrition. To this end, the whole of the Danube and Balkan basins must be seized in the first few hours of the war. We must not be content with declarations of neutrality, but must occupy the territories and exploit them for the necessary purpose of wartime food and industrial supplies. By this operation, which must be conducted with lightning speed and the utmost decision, not only would the "guaranteed" States, i.e. Greece, Romania and Turkey, be put out of commission, but we would also safeguard our rear. In this game of chess we can count on two favourable pawns: Hungary and Bulgaria.
8. Italy can mobilize a comparatively larger number of men than Germany. However, this abundance of men is balanced by modest means. Italy will, therefore, in the war plan, supply more men than material, and Germany more material than men.
I am desirous of knowing whether the above considerations meet with the Führer's approval. If so, the plans of the General Staff must be prepared on these directives.
MUSSOLINI
