January 3, 1940
Führer,
Four months have passed since the exchange of letters between us during the first part of September, during which four months your attention has been completely absorbed by action and I have considered it inopportune to disturb you. But today, while there is a period of waiting, I consider it necessary to submit to you an examination of the situation from my point of view and speak to you about the problems of the moment with that absolute sincerity and loyalty which have been and are the very conditions of our personal and political relations.
Ciano's speech. I shall begin with that speech, which has been the only political declaration of the Fascist Government since September. It has come to my knowledge that some parts of this speech did not please certain German circles. I need not tell you that it represents my thoughts from the first to the last word, and I believe that it was absolutely necessary to explain to the Italian people the origin of events and the reasons for our present attitude. The revelation of some details of the truth, such as the fact that both of us desired a rather long period of peace, did not do any harm to the German cause. You know that Count Ciano has been and is still one of the most convinced champions of Italo-German friendship, and for this very reason it was his duty to enlighten Italians and foreigners. That there have been more or less ridiculous speculations concerning Ciano's speech is unimportant. Whatever he might have said, the same thing would have happened.
Around the horizon. I now wish to tell you about Italy's relations with the other European states. I shall begin with the State which is contained within the city of Rome. I can inform you that the recent exchange of visits between the King and the Pope has been of a predominantly domestic significance, not international. The conversations have been brief and general, without anything definitive or anything in the nature of proposals; nor could it have been otherwise.
You will not be surprised if I tell you that the German-Russian agreement has had painful repercussions in Spain. The Civil War is too recent. The earth which covers the dead — yours and ours and the Spanish — is still fresh. Bolshevism is a memory that obsesses Spain and the Spaniards; with their passionate and fanatical logic they do not understand the tactical necessities of politics. It is clear that what Germany and Italy have lost during the last few months in Spain has been won by the French and the British.
The relations of Italy with the French and the British are correct but cool. We are supplying both with goods of various kinds, some of which may indirectly aid the war effort, but all deliveries of a a typically military nature have been prohibited. The existence of these commercial relations permits us to acquire those raw materials without which we cannot complete our military preparations and which therefore ultimately benefit Germany as well. The rumors of political conversations are false. Between us and the British there was a period of strong tension in connection with the blockade, and although the the procedures of the British have been modified for the better, things are far from normal and from that complete freedom for our shipping which we intend to ensure for ourselves. Neither in Paris nor in London does anyone have any illusions about seeing the phenomenon of 1914-15 repeated in 1940 or 1941. The Italian stimmung (sentiment) is still strongly anti-British, in spite of the propaganda to which I shall revert later.
The Balkans. We have never intended, and do not now intend, to form that bloc which became "suspect" from the moment that it was sponsored by the big democracies. I regard peace in the Danubian basin as of fundamental interest to Germany.
Russia. Although Count Ciano's speech made no mention of Finland, the Russian Ambassador in Rome did not present his credentials and departed. We have recalled our Ambassador from Moscow. Relations between Rome and Moscow are bad. We shall do nothing to aggravate them, but the attitude of the Russians is a matter of indifference to us.
Finland. Fascist Italy is favorably disposed toward this brave little nation, in spite of the sanctions which the Government voted for at Geneva but which the better part of the Finnish people did not accept. There has been talk of immense aid given by Italy to Finland. That is a matter of 25 fighter planes ordered before the war and nothing else. Thousands of volunteers have presented themselves individually at the Finnish Legation in Rome and at the Consulates, but the offers have to date been declined by the Finns.
Motives of Anglo-French propaganda. Through the Catholics and the remnants of the old parties, through radio broadcasts (which we cannot effectively interfere with and which are freely listened to) and through personal relations, the British, more than the French, are conducting intensive propaganda. As regards the responsibility for the war, no Italian believes in the innocence of Great Britain. As regards the war aims of the big democracies, no Italian takes seriously the words 'liberty', 'justice', 'right', 'morality', etc., which are pronounced by the talking heads of those democracies.
But British propaganda is emphasizing two facts, namely, the Russo-German agreements, which in practice mark the end of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the treatment which is said to have been meted out in Poland to the genuinely Polish population. On this point the German counter-propaganda seems late and weak. A people which has been ignominiously betrayed by its miserable politico-military governing class but which as you yourself chivalrously recognized in your Danzig speech fought courageously, deserves a treatment which does not give occasion for hostile speculations. It is my conviction that the creation of a modest, disarmed Poland which is exclusively Polish, liberated from the Jews (for whom I fully approve your project of gathering them all in a large ghetto in Lublin), can no longer constitute any threat to the Greater Reich. If this were done, it would be an element of great importance which would deprive the big democracies of any justification for continuing the war and would liquidate the ridiculous Polish Republic created by the French and British at Angers. Unless you are irrevocably resolved to prosecute the war to a finish, I believe that the creation of a Polish state under the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and constitute a condition sufficient for peace.
You might—as in fact your radio broadcasts to the French do every day—reaffirm that you do not have any war aims in the West and thereby, before the world, place the responsibility for the continuation of the conflict on the French and the British, and in any event refrain, as you have done hitherto, from taking the initiative on the Western front.
I am profoundly convinced that Great Britain and France will never succeed in making your Germany, assisted by Italy, capitulate, but it is not certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British to their knees or even divide them. To believe that is to delude oneself. The United States would not permit a total defeat of the democracies. Empires crumble for lack of internal equilibrium, whereas blows from the outside may consolidate them. As you have said, it is possible to foresee an outcome of the war with both sides losing. Now that you have secured your eastern frontiers and created the Greater Reich of 90 million inhabitants, is it worth while to risk all—including the regime—and sacrifice the flower of German generations in order to hasten the fall of a fruit which must of necessity fall and be harvested by us, who represent the new forces of Europe? The big democracies carry within themselves the seeds of their decadence.
Agreements with Russia. No one knows better than I, who have now had 40 years of political experience, that politics—even revolutionary politics—has its tactical exigencies. I recognized the Soviet government in 1924; in 1934 I concluded with them a treaty of commerce and friendship. So I realize that since von Ribbentrop's efforts toward non-intervention by the French and the British were not realized, you have avoided a second front. Without striking a blow, Russia has, in Poland and the Baltic, profited from the war.
But I, a born revolutionary who has not modified his way of thinking, tell you that you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of your Revolution to the tactical exigencies of a certain political moment. I feel that you cannot abandon the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik banner which you have been flying for 20 years and for which so many of your comrades have died; you cannot renounce your gospel, in which the German people have blindly believed. It is my definite duty to add that a further step in your relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where anti-Bolshevik sentiment, especially among the Fascist masses, is absolute, solid as rock, unanimous and indivisible.
Permit me to believe that this will not happen. The solution of your Lebensraum problem is in Russia and nowhere else; in Russia, which has the immense area of 21 million square kilometers and 9 inhabitants per square kilometer. Russia is alien to Europe. In spite of her extent and her population, Russia is not a power but a weakness. The mass of her population is Slavic and Asiatic. In olden times the element of cohesion was furnished by the people of the Baltic; today, by the Jews; that explains everything. Germany's task is this: to defend Europe from Asia. That is not only Spengler's thesis. Until four months ago Russia was world enemy number one; she cannot have become, and is not, friend number one. This has profoundly disturbed the Fascists in Italy and perhaps also many National Socialists in Germany.
The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have kept faith with our two Revolutions. It will then be the turn of the big democracies, which cannot survive the cancer which is gnawing at them and which manifests itself in the demographic, political, and moral fields.
The situation of Italy. I am accelerating the tempo of military preparations. Italy cannot and does not wish to become involved in a long war ; her intervention should come at the most profitable and decisive moment. In East Africa Italy is containing considerable French forces at Jibuti and in the adjacent British colonies. The 15 divisions in North Africa (8 regular army, 4 Blackshirt, and 3 Libyan divisions) are containing 80,000 British, Egyptians, and Indians and 250,000 French. In the Alps our troop dispositions have been restrained—but not reduced—by the snow, and the troops confront from 10 to 15 French divisions.
Fascist Italy intends at this time to constitute your reserve:
a) from the political and diplomatic point of view, in case you should desire to reach a political and diplomatic solution;
b) from the economic point of view, aiding you to the greatest possible extent in everything which may strengthen your resistance to the blockade;
c) from the military point of view, when the aid will be not a burden but a relief to you. And this question should be studied by the military.
I believe that the non-intervention of Italy has been and is much more useful to Germany than intervention, which in the war against Poland would have been entirely superfluous.
I desire the German people to be convinced that the attitude of Italy is within, not outside, the framework of the Alliance.
MUSSOLINI
