March 8, 1943
Führer,
I wish to begin by thanking you most cordially for the letter you sent me through von Ribbentrop, with whom I discussed some of the important points raised in that letter during the recent talks in Rome. I nevertheless deem it expedient to set forth in these pages the considerations and conclusions prompted by a general review of the situation. Allow me to address the subjects in the order in which they are mentioned in your letter.
1) Tunisia. I am pleased to see that you too, dear Führer, regard Tunisia as an essential factor of the strategic campaign.
The imperative to follow is clear: We must remain in Tunisia, whatever the cost: in any case we must stay there as long as possible, since this will interfere profoundly, and perhaps decisively, with the execution of the plans drawn up by the Anglo-Saxons at Casablanca. In order to hold Tunisia, we must extend our bridgehead and not shrink it as Rommel wanted, since this would mean being overwhelmed and — in short — driven towards the sea, without means of escape, given the superiority which the enemy would gain from linking up his armies and being able to use all the airfields abandoned by us in Tunisia. I am convinced that we must resist on the Mareth Line. But in order to resist, and perhaps even counter-attack, our forces must be provisioned; and above all guns, tanks, and petrol must reach them. Shipping on the short but compulsory route of the Sicilian Channel must be safeguarded. To obtain all this, Führer, I will never tire of repeating it: the Axis air forces in the zone of Sardinia, Sicily and Tunisia must be at least equal in strength to the enemy's air forces. We failed to capture Egypt because of our inferiority in the air; we will lose Tunisia too if this fundamental requirement is not met.
2) Balkans. As regards the action in Croatia, I also believe that the results during the first half of Operation Weiss, if not decisive, were nevertheless satisfactory. As for the action undertaken by the Italian 5th Army Corps which you mention, Führer, my High Command pointed out that the plan drawn up by General Loehr envisioned the engagement and destruction of rebel forces by a rapid advance of German swift columns on Bihac-Bos, Petrovac-Kliuc. These places should have been reached on the first day, namely January 20th, by the SS Division Prinz Eugen (Bihac-Bos, Petrovac) and by the 717th Division (Kliuc) respectively.
On the other hand, the task assigned to the Italian troops of the 5th Corps was a methodical advance from west to east; they were to mop up as they advanced, taking the towns of Slunj, Bihac, Korenica, Udbina. The operation did not take place as planned. The Germans failed to carry out their swift penetration, and the objectives which should have been reached between January 20 and 21 were not reached until January 28 and February 3.
Despite the serious handicap of mountainous terrain, high snow and fierce rebel resistance, the troops of the 5th Corps, who were entrusted with carrying out methodical mopping-up operations, succeeded in reaching the objectives which had been assigned to them. Slunj was captured on January 25; Korenica on February 2; Udbina on February 4.
As for the second phase of the operation, as has been agreed upon with Gen. Warlimont, the Italian Command will give the utmost support to secure the flank of the German divisions operating towards Livno-Glamoc and to close the Partisans' escape routes southwards.
Minister Ribbentrop has probably informed you, Führer, that the Partisan-Chetnik matter has been discussed at length. We entirely agree that the Chetniks and Partisans are enemies of the Axis and that tomorrow they would be ready to make common cause against us, particularly in the event of a landing, in which case they would place us in a very difficult position. In order to meet the demands of guerrilla warfare, for which the Chetniks, like all Balkan peoples, are particularly suited, some thousands of Chetniks had been locally armed by the Italian Command. These Chetniks have up until now fought the Partisans very vigorously. In light of the present circumstances, I called Gen. Robotti and Gen. Pirzio Biroli to Rome, and have given them the following orders:
a) no further delivery of arms to the Chetniks;
b) they must be disarmed as soon as the Partisans no longer constitute a dangerous armed movement (brigandage of a more or less political complexion will always linger on as a chronic feature of those regions);
c) Army Gen. Pirzio Biroli is in charge of contacting the O.K.W. [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] with a view to coordinate further action against the movement of Gen. Mihajlovich, who, despite being described as a traitor by Partisan radio transmissions, is nevertheless our enemy, since he is the Minister of War of the Yugoslav Government in London. Nor am I unaware of the plans entertained by this gentleman in regards to a territorial revision at Italy's expense.
I have just this moment received notice that the German forces which came into contact with the Chetnik formations in the Upper Narenta Valley have allegedly agreed upon collaboration. The Germans are alleged to have handed over cartridges and hand grenades to the Chetniks.
3) Landings and second front. It goes without saying that the Allies must attempt to set up a second front in Europe. Russia's demands are imperious. When — as I firmly believe — Russian initiative finally comes to a standstill, the Anglo-Saxons will have to honor their commitments and land in some part of Europe. I believe it is appropriate to distinguish between attempted landings — of which there may be many, with the aim of disorienting us and, if possible, splitting our forces — and the actual invasion.
Were Tunisia to be definitely lost, I foresee the following actions against Italy:
a) massive bombardments of the northern and southern regions of Italy;
b) commando and parachute landings in Sicily and Sardinia, for the purpose of improving the Allies' maritime position. An actual invasion of the Peninsula is an undertaking which the Anglo-Saxons cannot seriously envisage.
Faced with these eventualities, all our defensive plans for the two islands have been accelerated. A report on the subject will be made available to you by a commission of your officers who visited the fortification system of Sardinia. There are currently four divisions in Sardinia. A fifth will be sent within the month. I have been informed that the defense of the island will be perfected with the arrival of a German contingent equipped with those weapons that we lack. Our problem, dear Führer, consists in the fact that we are compelled to fight a "proletarian style" war with arms left over from the war of 1915-1918. Only in the course of this year shall we begin to have those modern weapons, without which no stand can be made against the onslaught of masses abundantly supplied with modern equipment, as the Anglo-Saxons are. Apart from surprise action, I believe that any attempt at landing in our islands is doomed to failure.
4) Spain. I have given your Minister, von Ribbentrop, a copy of the letter sent to me by Franco through the new Ambassador, and a copy of my reply. I believe, dear Führer, that you were wise in helping to build up the efficiency of the Spanish armed forces. Spain is still a card in our game — notwithstanding the oscillations of Franco's policy — and I believe we could play it most advantageously should the day come when it would enable us to cross his territory and take the whole North African deployment of the Anglo-Americans in the rear. I understand that our enemies are extremely fearful of a move of this type.
5) Russian Front. You may well imagine, Führer, how attentively and passionately I have followed the latest operations on the eastern front. The doubt never crossed my mind — not for a single moment — that the armed forces of your Reich would not restabilize the situation. The heroism of your soldiers, which you documented with a description of the losses suffered by the SS divisions, has been universally acknowledged. The effort which Germany is about to put forth — in response to your appeal — is truly unparalleled in the history of any people. Therefore I am convinced that, at a given moment, the Bolsheviks will find their path barred by an unsurpassable wall. But on the day when you, dear Führer, with your men and your material, will have achieved the eastern wall, an exhausted Russia will no longer represent the mortal peril of two years ago. And unless you have the absolute certainty of destroying her strength once and for all, I ask myself whether it is not risking too much. It means repeating the struggle against the infinite, elusive and practically unattainable space of Russia, while the Anglo-Saxon peril grows in the west. The day when Russia is eliminated or neutralized, one way or the other, victory will be ours. But I look forward to discussing this matter thoroughly with you when I shall have the pleasure of seeing you.
6) Italian Army Corps. Italy cannot remain absent from the Russian Front, hence the Second Army Corps will remain in Russia. It must be reorganized and reequipped with efficient weapons, because with a lengthy deployment, such as that of the Eighth Army on the Don River, without reserves and with obsolete weapons, things could not be expected to go otherwise than how they did, despite the undeniable tenacious resistance of our units. But allow me to express to you the desire that the Italian Army Corps be employed in combat, not in rear services.
Finally, allow me, dear Führer, to thank you for your thoughtful inquiries about my health. I have still not yet fully recovered, but I am better and I believe that the worst part is over. I think the whole thing is due to the nervous tension of these last days. One cannot be in politics for 43 years without some part of one's body being affected by it. As a matter of fact, it does not bother me. The only thing that matters is to fight and win. Small personal ailments are trifling episodes compared to the diseases which demo-plutocracy and Jewry have inflicted on mankind, diseases which fire and sword will heal.
The examination of other less urgent questions I will defer to our meeting, which I hope will be soon. In the meantime, I wish to reiterate to you that my decision to march with you to the very end is as unshakable as ever. And I wish to add that responsible Italians are fully convinced that we must march to the end, no matter what happens.
Accept, Führer, my ever more comradely and cordial greetings.
MUSSOLINI
