By Benito Mussolini
Honourable Senators!
The last time that I had the honour to address you on foreign policy was on May 28th, 1926, exactly two years ago. My speech on that occasion was brief, and was limited to replying to certain observations which had been made during the debate on the Foreign Office vote. The speech which I mean to make to-day will be much longer, and will be analytical, as I mean to review all the political relations which Italy has with the world, to begin with the most distant and to end with the nearest. As Italy is today a World Power, her interests are not limited to any given sector or continent, so the review will begin with Asia, will cross Africa and America, and will end in Europe. I shall then discuss certain general questions, such as disarmament, reparations, the League of Nations, and shall conclude with a description of the organisation of the Foreign Office.
A country in the Far East which shows the most lively interest in Italian affairs and in the present political organisation of Italy is Japan. The relations between the two Governments, and I dare say between the two nations, are most cordial. The volume of trade is small. And yet Japanese exports to Italy in 1927 were approximately of a total value of 119 million lire, and Italian exports to Japan were valued at approximately 19 lire, consisting mostly of mercury, automobiles and marble.
Of particular interest to Italy is also the situation in China, whose internal struggles are keeping the constant attention of the diplomatic world and of public opinion at large. After two years of civil war the Chinese situation was further complicated by an attempted Bolshevik uprising which now appears to be completely liquidated. The situation, I may say, is still confused and obscure. Generally speaking, Northern China recognises Marshal Chang Tso-lin as its leader, while the southern provinces have rallied round the Nationalist Government in Nanking. Between the two are local Governors who act as they like and who two are local Governors who act as they wish and who really do not obey neither the North or the South.
A dramatic moment in this struggle took place in the period from September to December 1926, when Great Britain lost her concession in Hankow. It was at that time that the European Powers which had interests in China considered it necessary to send reinforcements and to establish a kind of united European front. Our Government, which already had in China the royal ships Libia, Caboto and Carlotto, sent two other warships, the Volta and the Muggia. As the situation seems to have acquired a chronic character with sudden sanguinary upheavals like the one which provoked the recent Japanese intervention in Shantung, the Volta has been recalled. The Italian marines have in all circumstances fulfilled their duty. At present the following military contingents are in China: 80 men of the Legation guard in Peking, 300 men of the Tientsin battalion and 80 men of the Shanghai contingent. It is rather difficult to determine the deeper significance of the Chinese civil wars and to predict their eventual outcome. One must not pass in silence the prediction that as a result of these struggles China may regain her national unity with a block of over 400 million people.
Italy and China have a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation which goes back to 1866 and the revision of which, so far as the commercial part is concerned, China may demand between July 1st and December 31st of the current year. Analogous treaties with Belgium and Spain have been denounced in their entirety. Such denunciation might have grave consequences to our banking and commercial institutions and to some eleven Italian apostolic vicariates which we are resolved to protect, possibly with a friendly agreement. One can not speak of China without mentioning the Italian concession in Tientsin which is inhabited by approximately 7,500 people, of whom 150 are Italians, 7,000 Chinese and the rest of other nationalities. The political and moral importance of this most distant post of Italian civilization in the Far East is self-evident. It may be of interest to you, honourable Senators, to know that the budget of the concession, though small, has closed with a surplus of 600,000 lire.
To return and conclude with China, we hope the political situation there will clear up and become settled so that we may maintain the close relations of friendship between Italy and China which have always existed since the time when Italian travelers traversed those distant countries where one of the oldest and most interesting civilizations of the world had developed.
From China I pass to Siam. With that State we also had a treaty which was signed in 1868. It was replaced by a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation signed on May 9th, 1926. The volume of our trade is limited; still, 277 Italian automobiles were exported to Siam in 1927. There are possibilities of increasing our trade now that the Treaty of Commerce has determined and facilitated the relations.
Much more extensive are the commercial relations between Italy and British India. Our Government considered that in order to strengthen them it was fitting to reorganise and increase the Italian consular representation. We have established, therefore, an Italian Vice-Consulate in Madras and a Consulate in Colombo.
state which deserves particular attention in view of its geographic position, constitution, and power is Afghanistan.
The European trip of King Amanullah Khan began in Italy. This favour shown to us comes from the fact that Italy was the first Allied Power to recognise the independence of Afghanistan, proclaimed in 1919. Italian-Afghan trade is at present very small, due, on the one hand, to the geographic situation of Afghanistan, an ultra-continental country wedged between India and Russia and separated from the sea by hundreds of miles, and, on the other, to the fact that Afghanistan has no railways and no banking system. However, Italy has recently concluded contracts for the delivery of military supplies and automobiles, and a mission of technical experts is now being prepared. It is also important, from the standpoint of Italian prestige in Central Asia, that Afghanistan has sent its first twenty-five aviation cadets to the Aeronautical Academy in Caserta. These young men are already in Caserta. When they return to their country with their pilot licenses they will not forget their sojourn in Italy. It is by means of such exchanges of men and services that relations between nations are fostered.
I am convinced that Afghanistan, a strictly Islamic country, inhabited by strong and warlike races, ruled by a king in whom Oriental traditions are happily blended with the audacity of the West, is destined to play a preponderant role in the politics of Central Asia.
The ever cordial relations between Italy and Persia are actually dominated by the question of the renewal of the Italo-Persian treaty of friendship and commerce of 1862 which was denounced by the Teheran Government on May 8th, 1927. The treaty relations were not denounced in regard to Italy alone, but also in regard to all other states which had agreements with Persia based on capitulations. The principal aim of the Persian Government's action is, as has been stated, the ultimate liberation of the country from the capitulation system.
The Powers concerned have for some time past been engaged in conversations with the Persian Government in order to obtain certain guarantees in place of the lost capitulatory rights and some of them have already concluded provisional agreements to that effect. As Italian interests are involved in this question, the Government can not help, of course, being preoccupied with it, and the cordiality with which the negotiations with the Persian Government are being carried on makes us believe that in a very short time we shall arrive at a modus vivendi on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause.
The cordiality of the relations between the two countries has been confirmed by the recent request of the Persian Government to the Foreign Ministry for two Italian technicians, to whom the organisation of the Persian State shipping services will be entrusted.
Leaving the Indian Ocean and coming to the Red Sea, we find another country with which Italy has signed a treaty of friendship and economic relations: Yemen.
The treaty constitutes an official recognition of the strengthening of friendly relations between Italy and Yemen, and at the same time of the complete independence of Yemen and its Sovereign.
Inspired solely by the desire of establishing loyal friendship with the Arabian countries through the pacification of the Emirates and the increase of their economic activity, our action, being greatly favoured by the renewed prestige of Italy, who is a friend of the Muslim world and is conscious of her functions as a great Muslim Power, could not fail to win the approval of the Yemenite population and its chief whose political power found for the first time an opportunity to assert itself in an international act.
The voyage of one of the sons of the Iman Jahia in Italy sealed these friendly political relations which hold forth the prospects of increased trade between Massawa and Hodeida. An Italo-Arabian company is actually studying this question. The name of Italy is popular in the Yemen and the only Europeans who for a certain time were able to travel in Yemen were Italians. The ruler of Yemen will never have cause to regret the signature of his first political treaty of friendship and economic relations with Italy.
Crossing the Red Sea, we pass from our first colony to the Ethiopian Empire. The relations with Abyssinia have also become very friendly, especially after the journey of Ras Tafari to Italy. The clouds which agents of other interests had conjured on the horizon of Italian-Abyssinian relations have now disappeared. A Treaty of Friendship — the first which Abyssinia has signed with a European Power — will in all probability consecrate this new and happy state of affairs.
The relations of Italy with all the Republics of South America are very cordial. That continent is settled by numerous industrious, and for this reason highly respected, Italian communities. Italy has concluded a political treaty only with one of those states, namely Chile. On February 24th, 1927, a Treaty of Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was signed between Italy and Chile.
Brazil has placed some orders for submarines with Italian industrial concerns. The orders from the Argentine Navy have increased, and this may be considered as a traditional recognition by the great Argentine Republic of the quality of our work and of our skill.
I should not like to leave South America without mentioning Uruguay, a country which has always given us concrete proofs of its friendship and which has sent quite recently an Ambassador Extraordinary, and all the other Republics from Peru to Uruguay, from Ecuador to Venezuela, including Colombia, maintain relations of perfect cordiality with Italy.
In North America there is a state extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with a population of one hundred and twenty millions, with immense riches, with a gigantic capacity for work, and renowned for its technical and scientific progress: the United States.
The Republic of the Stars and Stripes has played since the war a very great role, a preponderant role, in the history of the world. The centre of world finance has shifted from Europe to America. The United States are creditors of all nations, especially of those on our old Continent, to the extent 12,000 million dollars. American initiative seems to be preparing to conquer Europe. An examination of this phenomenon, which has already brought forth a vast literature, would carry me too far. At any rate, this phenomenon is always before our eyes in the most varied forms: philanthropy, banking, science, and industry. It is not possible to predict how high America's ambition for power may rise and with what resistances it may eventually meet. So far as Italy is concerned, the relations with the United States during the last three years have been influenced by three events of special importance.
It may suffice to recall only the first event, that is to say, the settlement of our war debt. In the midst of the exchange crisis, on June 15th, 1925, I sent the following message to our Ambassador in Washington:
"After a conversation with the Finance Minister, in the course of which we examined the question whether the actual depreciation of our exchange may not be due to the uncertainty of our debt negotiations with the United States, we have reached the decision to invite Your Excellency to begin official negotiations in respect of the settlement of our debt. Your Excellency is therefore authorised to communicate this immediately to the American Government. As soon as your Excellency has officially communicated the Italian Government's decision to open regular negotiations for the settlement of the debt, Your Excellency will keep me informed every day of the preliminary progress as well as of the impression in American financial quarters."Subsequently Count Volpi negotiated with success the consolidation of our debt, which was the first step on the way to financial recovery. Another event in the relations between Italy and the United States was the invitation to a conference on naval armaments. The Senate may remember that Italy declined the invitation.
In my reply to the American proposal I stated the reasons which prevented Italy from taking part in the proposed conference at Geneva. The conference was held without the presence of Italy and France, and ended in complete failure, as a result of the serious divergencies of views between the United States and Great Britain on the question of tonnage and of the number of cruisers.
The third event came to an end last April: the signing of a Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration between the United States and Italy. The nature of this Treaty is defined in its articles and especially in its preamble. At present the Kellogg proposal is on the agenda, and Italy's attitude in respect of it has been defined in a public note. Before leaving the subject of the relations between the United States and Italy, I should like to refer to two questions which from time to time have provoked polemics and excited American public opinion. So far as the American law on emigration and relative quota is concerned, the maintenance of the quota, though it may be objectionable to us by reason of the motives which have provoked it, leaves us otherwise practically indifferent. For the last two years the Fascist Government has followed a policy of voluntary restriction and control of emigration. A clear proof of this change of policy may be found in the abolition of the Commissariat for Emigration, and in its replacement by a Directorate-General for Italians abroad at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Whether the United States will modify or maintain the so-called immigration bill is an affair which concerns them alone. People of Italian descent who have become naturalised Americans are American citizens by law and by fact, and consequently foreigners to us. We only hope that they are proud of their origin.
Finally, all discussion about the Fascist Leagues in foreign countries has ceased after the publication of the statute for Fascist Leagues in foreign countries which was dictated by me personally, and which defines in the most formal manner the tasks and attributes of those organizations, whose usefulness can not be doubted when they are composed, as they should be, of gentlemen who honour their distant Fatherland by their work, discipline and personal dignity.
And now, honourable Senators, we shall fly over the Atlantic and land in our old, glorious, and yet restless Europe. Here the panorama is more complicated; the interests are more vivid, the reality more immediate, the sentiments more pronounced. One must proceed in an orderly fashion and with care in examining the situation. I shall begin with Great Britain.
When people speak of the traditional friendship between Great Britain and Italy they do not repeat a commonplace saying but express a real fact. The friendship between the two peoples is deep; I should rather say that they have never been divided in the past, that they cooperated in the Great War, worked together for peace, and settled the only colonial question pending between them, namely, the question of Trans-Juba. At Locarno they renewed this close collaboration in the interest of European peace. When I say that the friendship between the countries is deep, I mean that this sentiment is not limited to the necessarily restricted official quarters but extends to the large masses of the population.
The change of men at the Foreign Office has never altered this situation, which evidently is due to reasons of the highest order. I had the pleasure and honour of meeting Sir Austen Chamberlain in December 1925 at Rapallo and in September 1926 at Livorno. You recall, honourable Senators, the controversial and journalistic ravings caused by those two meetings. The eminent statesman, who directs the Foreign Ministry of the British Empire, was even accused of having encouraged Fascist Imperialism and some of the later events were explained as arising from a kind of authorization which Chamberlain was said to have given to Italian policy. Nothing could be more fantastic. The Italy of today does not need to ask for such an authorisation of her policy. Italy is perfectly autonomous in the conduct of her foreign policy. I want to add that friendship with Great Britain is one of the cardinal points of this policy.
This friendship needs no special protocols to be strengthened and improved. The efforts of the Fascist Government are directed toward this goal.
From Great Britain I cross over to the Continent and begin with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics which once was called Russia and which for the sake of brevity I shall still call Russia. The relations between Italy and Russia are normal. As you will remember, Italy recognised Russia officially in 1924, and concluded a Commercial Treaty with her. As the practical results of this treaty have been much discussed, it may be useful to give you the figures of the volume of trade between the two countries. They are the following:
In 1925 Italian imports from Russia were estimated at 149,188,000 lire and Italian exports to Russia at 171,256,000 lire. In 1926 our imports were 344,851,616 and our exports 124,511,369; in 1927 our imports were 394,735,633 and our exports 43,441,401 lire; the latter figures are not final.
Thus it appears that the volume of trade is small. The reasons for this are known. They are not only due to the state monopoly of foreign trade, but are explained also by the fact that Russia must buy on credit. Now, in this field Italy cannot compete with other Powers which can wait with ease. An endeavour has been made to meet this deficiency by the establishment of a financing institution which would advance to Italian exporters the sums required for the fulfilment of orders covered by Russian bills of various maturities.
In 1925 and 1926 we were asked to conclude a political treaty with Russia, but the matter did not go beyond the phase of simple preliminary conversations.
Passing from Russia over the crests of the Baltic and the Scandinavian countries, we come to Poland. With Latvia we signed a Commercial Treaty on July 25th, 1925, which was ratified on January 25th, 1927.
Thanks to the 'most-favoured-nation' clause, the agreement assures us the application of the new Latvian minimum tariff which came into force on April 16, 1928, and this is likely to have a favourable effect on the exportation of certain Italian products to Latvia. Our relations with Finland are of the best, and we have concluded with her a Commercial Treaty which is beginning to show results. Excellent are likewise our relations with Lithuania; they have been embodied in a Political and a Commercial Treaty. Our relations with Lithuania, which were confirmed by the visit of Valdemaras to Rome, enabled us to exercise a useful "soothing" influence at the gravest moment in the tension between Lithuania and Poland. With this last Great Power which has sprung from the war and has now been consolidated into a unitary state, and continues every day to strengthen her political, economic, and cultural position ; with Poland, I say, we have no political treaty, no matter what may have been reported during the recent visit of Zaleski to Rome. Thus all the fantastic rumours about the nature and purposes of Zaleski's voyage, none of which was on the agenda, fall to the ground.
My meeting with Zaleski was, however, most useful because the exchange of ideas and the examination of the European situation showed the possibility of a common and naturally peaceful action between Poland and Italy in certain directions and in given cases. Italy and Poland have many common motives of an historic, cultural and economic character which render their collaboration possible and fruitful. I need hardly emphasize the political importance of resurrected Poland with her population of 30 million people, situated between immense Russia and thickly populated Germany, who is regaining her strength.
The relations of Italy with Germany are cordial. We have a commercial treaty, the value of which could not be fully appreciated at the time of the instability of the Italian currency, and we have a treaty of conciliation and of judicial settlement concluded in December 1926 for ten years.
To turn from the relations between the two Governments to the not less important relations between the Italian and German peoples themselves, it must be said that they could be infinitely better if the natural sympathies of former times were not diminished today by the acts of certain irresponsible circles which want to interfere with questions of the internal policy of our State. If these clouds should vanish from the horizon — and I sincerely hope they will, the collaboration of the large masses of both nations in the economic field alone could bring great results. I may add that the relations have improved in the course of the past months. The welcome which not only the city of Stolp but all of Germany extended to General Nobile has been greatly appreciated by Italian public opinion.
We shall now cross the disputed and garrisoned Rhine. The somewhat disturbed history of our post-war relations with France is largely explained by the events at Versailles, attributed more or less justly to the political attitude of the representatives of the French Government of that time, who did not look upon the claims of their ally Italy with favour.
From the historical standpoint it may be useful to recall the past decade. But for you, honourable Senators, it is necessary to know the actual conditions. The situation today is greatly improved. To appreciate this change for the good, one must go back to the very delicate moment when the French treaty with Yugoslavia and the Italo-Albanian treaty of defensive alliance were signed. Since then we have gone a long way towards clarifying and stabilising the political relations between the two great Nations. Let us recall the speech of the Hon. Briand in the French Chamber, to which I replied by a declaration before the Cabinet. I must mention that Ambassador Besnard worked indefatigably for this understanding during the two years he spent in Rome. After the arrival of the new Ambassador, M. de Beaumarchais, official conversations were opened on March 19th. These conversations have been conducted in two directions. On the one hand, it was proposed to work for the conclusion of a broad political pact of friendship, according to M. Briand's expression; on the other, to settle by a series of protocols the disputed points between Italy and France. These points are essentially the following : Italy's position in Tangier; status of Italians in Tunis; rectification of the western frontier of Tripolitania. Other questions connected with other zones are not on the agenda for the obvious reason that they would necessitate the extension of the French-Italian negotiations to other states. This would complicate the situation and render it more delicate. I should like to add that the progress of the conversations justifies the belief in their happy conclusion.
The Tangier Agreement may be considered a happy augury for a successful conclusion. It may be useful to dwell at some length on this page of our diplomatic history, and to refer to what preceded it.
When the Italian Government learned at the end of 1920 of the intention of the London Government to resume with the Governments of Paris and Madrid the negotiations on the Tangier Statute which had been interrupted in 1914, it asked to be admitted to the negotiations and, in its note addressed at the end of October 1923, requested formally that an Italian representative should take part in the Paris Conference convoked for the purpose.
This Italian request was not accepted, and, in its subsequent note of December 25th, 1923, the Government renewed its fullest reserves in regard to the decisions which might have been adopted in Paris, and more particularly in respect of its future liberty of action. Our attitude was based on the following considerations:
1) First of all, Italy, as a great Mediterranean Power and also in view of her share in the Allied victory, through which, so far as this particular question was concerned, Germany and Austria had been barred from Morocco, claimed the right of intervention in the regulation of all Mediterranean questions.
2) In view of all her interests in the Tangier question, resulting either from her special position as a great Mediterranean Power or from her local interests in the Tangier zone, Italy could not be considered in regard to this question on the same plane as the other Powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras.
The Three-Power Agreement led to the signature of the Paris Convention of December 18th, 1923. Our Government, faced with this fait accompli, declared to the British, French, and Spanish Governments that it was willing to adhere to the Paris Convention providing that its requests for the modification of the Convention be complied with.
Our requests, which, when put forward in 1924 and 1926, had not been accepted, were the same as those discussed at the recent Four-Power Conference in Paris. The conversations in Paris were carried on with calm, cordiality, and mutual understanding. The satisfactory results, in respect of the acceptance of our requests, fully confirmed the success which we had already obtained in principle by our participation in the Paris meetings on an equal footing with the three Powers signatory of the Convention of 1923.
The acceptance of our requests (as indicated later in this speech) constitutes an explicit recognition of the fact that Italy's position as a great and essentially Mediterranean Power Confers upon her the right to special consideration, not only in regard to the international organization of the Tangier Zone of Morocco but also in regard to the administration of this Zone.
The Italian Government requested the right to attach to its Consulate in Tangier an officer who would inform the Royal Government about the observance of the military engagements contained in Article 3 of the Convention and relating to the regime of neutrality of the Tangier zone.
This request was accepted. (As a matter of fact the functions of the officers of the four Powers in Tangier who will be charged with periodical visits to the zone have been regulated on a footing of absolute equality; it has been agreed that the control over the demilitarization of the zone does not justify the continuous presence of the officers in the zone).
Italy requested that the Italian naval forces should supervise jointly with the British, French and Spanish naval forces the contraband of arms and munitions in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone.
This request was accepted. (Thus full equality with Great Britain has been established; it has been decided that the form of intervention of the Italian and British navies in the specified cases shall be agreed upon among the four Powers).
Italy requested that the international legislative assembly mentioned in article 34 of the Convention should include three Italian members nominated by the royal consulate and should appoint an Italian vice-president with the same functions and rights as those conferred upon their colleagues.
This request was also accepted. The principal function of the vice-president is to assist the Mendoub (representative of the Sultan) in presiding over the assembly and of acting as deputy for him in his absence.
Italy requested the appointment of an assistant administrator of Italian nationality under the conditions provided in articles 35 and 36 of the Paris Convention, to whom, with the title of director, the judicial services should be entrusted.
This request was accepted. That, by the way, was our principal request which was the subject of the most lively discussions and remained in suspense until the very end. The difficulty was to find for the Italian assistant administrator functions and prerogatives which had not already been attributed to functionaries of the Tangier administration of other nationalities, so as to avoid opposition from Powers which would have otherwise felt prejudiced. These difficulties were overcome by our delegation with ingenuity and in this manner Italy's entry into the administration of Tangier was obtained with special regard to the judicial services.
Italy requested an equal share for her capital and labour in the construction and management of the port of Tangier.
This request was met by means of a corresponding modification of article 41 of the Convention of 1923, and by an explicit declaration in regard to equality of treatment of Italian capital and labour by the French and Spanish Governments, the two engineers of the port being nationals of these Powers.
Italy requested that an Italian magistrate should sit on the Mixed Tribunal of Tangier provided in paragraph I of article 48 of the Paris Convention and that one of the registrars mentioned in article 14 of the Dahir concerning the organization of an international jurisdiction of Tangier should be of Italian nationality. The codes which were issued in conformity with the said article 48 will be communicated to the Italian Government, and, in case the Italian Government finds it necessary to ask for some modifications, its requests will be examined within the shortest interval.
This request was accepted.
Italy requested that the Italian diplomatic representation in Tangier should be replaced by a consulate. The Italian Government may appoint a functionary from the diplomatic service as head of the consulate in Tangier with the grade of consul general.
This request was accepted.
Italy requested that the putting into force of the Paris convention of December 18th, 1923, in regard to Italian subjects and interests should be applied six months after the adherence of the Italian Government to the said Convention.
This request was accepted, while we agreed to the application of the fiscal regime to Italians in Tangier from the date of our adherence to the Statute.
Of the requests presented by Italy, on which we did not insist, only two were not accepted: the one relative to the post office and the other relative to our participation in the customs commission. We may well be satisfied with the results obtained, namely: an Italian assistant administrator, an Italian judge, and an Italian registrar in the Tribunal; three Italian members in the legislative assembly; an Italian Vice-president of the Assembly; equal treatment of Italian capital and labour; application of the (modified) Convention of 1923 to the present general Italian interests (which are larger than in 1923, as they include the recently established Italian hospitals and schools); participation in the maritime control in exceptional times on an equal footing with Great Britain; periodical visits to Tangier of an Italian officer on an equal footing with the other three Powers. We may well be satisfied because we have won a place for Italy in the administration of the Tangier Zone on an equal footing with Great Britain and, in any case, a more important place than the situation of Italian interests in 1923 would have enabled us to obtain at that time.
It is an evident Italian diplomatic success, to which the perfectly friendly attitude of the Spaniards and the British, as well as the cordiality of the French, have contributed. It is not out of place, therefore, to say that this agreement offers favourable prospects to us.
The importance of the general agreement between Italy and France is so evident that it appears superfluous to emphasize it. The definitive settlement of our relations with France is another element which will contribute to the stabilization of peace and to the development of the already large trade between the two nations, which, apart from the very subtle researches in kinship, have many fundamental elements of European civilization in common.
It can no longer be said that the impenetrable Pyrenees separate Spain from Europe. Spain is represented in Europe and in the world, and her political influence is increasing. I am convinced that Spain is now in the period of great recovery of her vitality which she seemed to have spent, when in fact she was only slumbering. Her awakening is evident in the economic, political and cultural fields. Her glorious history and the spirit of her great Catholic, dynastic and colonial traditions are ever present and active in the actual national rebirth.
One of the problems which caused the greatest anxiety to Spain, I mean Morocco, has been successfully solved by General Primo de Rivera, who, valorous soldier that he is, had given the example by the landing at Alhucemas, a glorious page in colonial military history. Not only on account of the affinity of our regimes, as some people think, but for more profound reasons, the relations between the two Governments and nations are excellent. A commercial treaty regulates our economic relations and a treaty of friendship and neutrality has established our political relations for a period of ten years. A closer collaboration of the two great Mediterranean nations is possible, and, I would like to say, it should be in the natural order of things; as there is nothing which divides the two countries, the relations between Spain and Italy may become still more intimate and their fraternal cooperation may extend over all the activities arising from contemporary life.
Before leaving the Iberian Peninsula, I want to say that Italy's relations with Portugal are also of the best. Attempts to alter them have not been spared in connection with the non-existent Italian pretensions to the Portuguese colonial possessions, but nobody in Lisbon has doubted the perfect loyalty and sincere friendship of Italy.
Before turning to another extremely interesting section of European politics, it is fitting to say a word about Switzerland, the cross-roads of Europe. Our relations with Switzerland are truly cordial and very friendly. I have called "perpetual" the treaty of friendship and arbitration which was signed on September 20th, 1924, though the instrument itself stipulates its duration for ten years. These lines of Italian policy are permanent: the activity of certain irresponsible quarters, which might have disturbed this policy, ceased a long time ago, and, as a matter of fact, it never gave any cause for anxiety. Italy has a fundamental interest in the existence of a free, independent and neutral Switzerland, and as regards the Canton of Ticino, which is Italian in language, race, and tradition, Italy's fundamental interest is that it should remain an integral and constructive element within the Swiss Confederation. Therefore, let those on this or on the other side of the St. Gotthard who have the habit of giving life to passing shadows take note of this clear, solemn, and definitive declaration.
With regard to Austria, I shall only say that our diplomatic relations are undisturbed, and that it depends upon Austria herself whether our relations will attain a higher grade of cordiality.
We now come to the threshold of Danubian and Balkan Europe. Here we must proceed with caution, because many and conflicting interests are constantly at play, and the dynamic force of policies is extraordinarily active. This is a region where the effects of the war are more visible owing to the changes in the political map; it is the zone where the fall of the Habsburg Empire caused the most far-reaching transformations. The Little Entente, which came into existence in the form of a union between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania for the maintenance of the peace treaties, is negative rather than positive in character, for the limits of this Entente are clearly defined, and the elements of the Little Entente, outside of the pure and simple preservation of the treaties, have no other great community of interests. Italy's relations with the Little Entente Powers were established in the course of the preceding years. There is a treaty of commerce and a pact of friendship and friendly co-operation between Italy and Czechoslovakia which was concluded at Rome on July 5th, 1924; there is another treaty of friendship and cooperation between Italy and Romania, which was concluded at Rome on September 16th, 1926. Soon after the signature of the latter treaty, Italy ratified the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors concerning Romania's possession of Bessarabia. It may be useful to recall that it was only after Italy's ratification that Romania's possession of Bessarabia was fully recognised from the international standpoint.
Finally, there is a pact of friendship, cooperation, and arbitration between Italy and Yugoslavia, signed at Rome on January 28th, 1924. It is necessary to dwell on this last political and diplomatic situation. Since the advent of the Fascist regime our policy towards Yugoslavia has always been the same. I am convinced that the relations between two States having a common frontier can not be based on indifference: they are either friendly or hostile. The latter alternative was discarded, and, the principle of friendship having been adopted, Italy has loyally followed a friendly policy towards Yugoslavia, such as was sanctioned by the treaty of 1924. As this treaty contemplated a further extension, the Nettuno Conventions were signed in 1925, regulating in a mutually satisfactory manner a whole series of important matters in the relations between the two States.
Italy has waited three years for Yugoslavia's ratification. She does not intend in the least to enter into the complicated parliamentary vicissitudes of the neighboring State but, on the other hand, she can not subordinate her foreign policy to them. Moreover, Italy is compelled to declare that the treaty of 1924 has not created the moral atmosphere by which friendship detaches itself from the official protocols of Governments and enters into the hearts of people. It is useless and dangerous to conceal facts : hostile propaganda against Italy is carried on in many Yugoslav quarters on a large scale, even by men who have political responsibilities. As an example, we have yesterday's speech of a Croat deputy, a former and perhaps future Minister, inciting to war against Italy and prophesying the signature of an armistice in Venice.
All this is due to a complete ignorance of conditions in Fascist Italy and to manifestations of megalomania which are so exaggerated that they become political childishness. One can smile at them and remain perfectly calm as Italy has done, but it would be a grave mistake not to take any account of them.
The explanation of the recent happenings in Spalato, Sebenico, Zagreb, will be found in this atmosphere of excitement and misunderstanding, of which the world must at last be informed. Recent events have been extremely grave because of their violence and destructiveness, and particularly because they were provoked not so much by the non-existent incidents in Zara or by the behaviour of Italian students, which was perfect in discipline as behooves a great people, as by the simple announcement that M. Marinkovitch had decided to submit the Nettuno Conventions to the Skupstina, giving thereby a proof of his goodwill and courage.
As soon as I received the reports from our Consuls and of our Minister in Belgrade I requested, by a formal note, the satisfaction which the gravity of the case demanded. Satisfaction was accorded by the Belgrade Government in a note which you all know. From the diplomatic standpoint the incidents are therefore closed. I see in this prompt and loyal acceptance of the Italian requests a sign of the goodwill of Dr. Marinkovic, as well as the intention to foster this policy of friendship, which Italy, on her part, wishes sincerely to follow, not only in the interests of the two States but also for the sake of European peace.
To finish this delicate subject I want to speak plainly from the tribune of this High Assembly, to certain elements beyond Monte Nevoso: Be prudent and careful. Do not listen to the empty words of anti-Fascists who flatter themselves on being able to play through you their last card. Return to reality. Italy does not hate you and does not oppose your peaceful progress, but try to understand us and remember that Italy, who at all times has made a great contribution to human civilization, is today with the Fascist regime a nation whose friendship you should cultivate instead of igniting her hostility.
Wedged between the states of the Little Entente there is a nation whose relations with Italy have reached a high degree of cordiality in these last years; I am speaking of Hungary, whose Prime Minister, Count Tisza, as it has now been established beyond any doubt, did not want war, and who has suffered the direct consequences of the war. Friendly relations between Italy and Hungary in all fields have lasted for centuries. War interrupted them. When peace came Hungary's sacrifices did not end. In 1919 and 1920 those terrible 122 days of Bolshevik dictatorship occurred and then came the monetary catastrophe. Before leaning out of her window to look again at the world, Hungary had to begin her complete political and economic reconstruction. When this had been achieved, she tried to abandon her isolation. Loyally and unselfishly Italy offered her hand to Hungary. A solemn diplomatic act, signed at Rome in April of last year, sealed the friendship of the two States and two peoples.
Italy's friendship was evident on the following occasions: the abolition of military control in Hungary; the conclusion of the tragi-comedy of the St. Gotthard machine guns; the question of the optants, and, among other things, the shipping facilities granted to Hungary in the port of Fiume. Hungary can count on Italy's friendship. It may be said that the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon had cut too deeply into the flesh and it may be added that for a thousand years Hungary has performed in the Danubian Basin an historic mission of importance. The Hungarian people, with their fervent patriotism, their consciousness of their power, their persevering work in time of peace, deserve a better fate. Not only from the point of view of universal equity, but also in the interest of Italy, it may be well that this better fate of Hungary should find its realization.
Bulgaria is a Balkan State whose relations with Italy have since the war been marked by sincere friendship. The dramatic vicissitudes of Bulgaria in the post-war period are well-known. She has been on the brink of political and social dissolution, but the deep forces of the nation came to the surface, and during the last three years the political situation seems to have been stabilized. The Bulgarians well know in what sad political moments they have had concrete and decisive proofs of Italy's friendship, and so I shall no longer dwell on this subject. But they must know that also in the future they may count on Italy's friendship.
This survey has now brought me to the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. The relations with Greece have for a long time now been imbued with cordiality and a spirit of collaboration. It is possible that in the near future these relations may be embodied in and sealed by a treaty. Had the Greco-Turkish question been settled, Greece would have signed a treaty with Italy, analogous to our treaty with Turkey.
Italy has made every effort, through her Minister in Athens and her Ambassador in Angora, to settle the Greco-Turkish differences arising from the application of certain clauses of the Lausanne Treaty, and considerable progress has been made towards an agreement. Italy has waited a few weeks; finally, on the day after the Greek Ministerial crisis, she signed the treaty with Turkey which had been completed a month ago. At the same time, she notified M. Micalacopoulos that she was ready to sign a similar treaty with Greece as soon as Greece considered it opportune. I hope everyone in Greece will realise that Italy's conduct has been perfectly loyal and proper. No one could ask Italy to subordinate indefinitely her signature of the treaty with Turkey, which was held in readiness, to the settlement of the Greco-Turkish relations when these relations had no direct interest to her.
Italy hopes that the desired settlement of the Greco-Turkish relations will lead to the signature by Greece of treaties with Italy and Turkey and that by means of these three pacts peace will be established in all the Eastern Mediterranean.
We now come to our relations with Turkey. During the last two years, since the intrigues of elements alien to Turkey but hostile to Italy had ceased, Italo- Turkish relations have greatly improved. When I was approached by Turkey with the proposal to confirm this situation by a diplomatic pact, I readily welcomed this offer. Accordingly my meeting with Rushdi Bey, the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic, was arranged in Milan.
Since this meeting of April 3rd, 1928, the lines of the Protocol were laid down, and the agreement was signed at the Palazzo Chigi on May 30th. The importance of this Protocol, which seals the agreement between Italy and Turkey, is obvious. The horizon of the Eastern Mediterranean is now clear and free of all clouds. Italy meets Turkey in a sincere and friendly spirit. Now, one must get into the habit of looking at Turkey in a new light, as a nation boldly creating a new spirit within itself after having established a new constitution, as a strong and populous nation guided by a leader whose great prestige is linked with historical events of extreme importance, such as the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne.
Just a word about Albania and the first part of my speech will be finished. The nature of our relations with the small but important Albanian State was amply illustrated when the two political treaties concluded with Albania were submitted to you and to the other Chamber. To avoid repetition, I shall only say that from 1925 up to this day — from a time much earlier than the Treaty of Tirana — Albania has known that she could count on Italy's friendship and that this friendship was perfectly loyal, profoundly sincere and scrupulously careful not to commit any act or pronounce any word which could be interpreted as an intervention in the internal affairs of the Albanian State.
Italy has only one fundamental interest in Albania, namely, that that State guided by the firm and prudent hand of a man of such eminence like Ahmed Zaghou should consolidate its internal unity and its autonomy in external affairs. Great progress has been realized in the last three years. Albania is being reformed and transformed at a much faster pace than is generally thought.
In a few years Albania will be a State in the widest and truest sense of the world. Italy is happy to lend her co-operation to this great reformation of ancient, and at the same time youthful, Albania, who is bound to Italy by ties which may be called multi-centennial and traditional.
Honourable Senators!
From time to time I had occasion to declare that peace treaties were not eternal. I said this for the first time when a Deputy and later as the Head of Government in speeches and interviews. It is indeed strange to see the emotion created in various quarters by a declaration which is so obvious that it seems self-evident. It is not a question of doctrine ; it is a question of historic reality. No treaty has ever been eternal, because the world moves forward, because nations rise, grow, decline and sometimes die. The eternity of treaties would mean as if, at a given moment, humanity by a monstrous prodigy had become mummified, in other words, as if it had died.
It is not necessary to recall old history to show that peace treaties are not eternal; the nineteenth century is sufficient. One may refer to even more recent times to find a treaty which was not only not eternal but whose duration was very short: I refer to the Treaty of Sevres. Even the Covenant of the League of Nations does not recognise the principle of the "marble immobility" of peace treaties, since in one of the articles it opens the way for eventual revision. It would be interesting to determine, for example, how many clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have not been applied at all and how many have been or will be applied with moderation or with changes. Peace treaties are sacred in so far as they terminate glorious and sanguinary efforts, a period of immense sacrifice and great sufferings; but they are not the product of divine justice: they are the work of human intelligence which, especially at the end of a war, is subject to exceptional influences. Is there anyone here who would dare to affirm that the peace treaties and particularly the Treaty of Versailles are a perfect work? I say they are a human work, and therefore not perfect, but always open to greater improvement.
There are peace treaties, accomplished facts which answer the highest reasons of justice, accomplished facts which remain such and which nobody intends to revoke or even to question.
But treaties contain territorial, colonial, financial, and social clauses, which can be discussed, revised, and improved with a view to prolonging the duration of those treaties and to assuring more durable peace. When I suggested, in a speech I made a year ago in the other Chamber, that between 1935 and 1940 Europe would find herself at a most interesting and delicate moment in her history, I departed from the order of ideas which I have just examined. That statement or prophecy of mine — which is, after all, easy to make — must not be interpreted in a pessimistic sense. The fact is that we shall see at that time, as a consequence of the evolution of the Peace Treaties, the development of certain conditions which will determine a new phase in the situation existing among the various states of Europe. Special problems will then arise, but they can be, and I sincerely hope they will be, solved by the Governments in a peaceful manner.
Grave complications will be avoided if, in revising those of the parts of the Treaties which call for revision, fresh vigor is given to peace. This is the hypothesis which I cherish and with which the truly, sanely and clearly peaceful policy of the Fascist Government and Italian people is inspired. But since the opposite hypothesis must also be taken into account, nobody can in good faith wonder if, following the example of all other States, Italy wants to have the necessary armed forces for the defence of her existence and her future.
One of the fundamental provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which during the last years has been an object of continuous study, discussion and proposals, is the reparations. It is worth while to deal with this subject at some length.
1. The actual phase of the reparation problem which may be called the "conciliatory" phase, in contradistinction to the preceding "litigious" phase, has now lasted four years. As you well know, this phase is regulated by the London Agreement of August 1924, and began on September 1st of the same year. The London Protocol is based on the Dawes plan, and is practically one and the same thing with that plan. According to its authors, it does not pretend to offer a definite solution of the problem, but a medium for the re-establishment of German faith and credit, and the readjustment of Germany's economic situation, and further to furnish the necessary information and competent opinions leading to another and more definite solution of the problems of reparations and those connected with them.
The Dawes plan does not take the total amount of Germany's debt into consideration, neither does it establish the number of the payments of which the plan gave the yearly figure. It only aims to determine Germany's capacity to pay, and to indicate the amount due every year, and that is: one billion gold marks the first year, one billion and two hundred million the second, and so on, up to two billion and a half in the fifth year which will begin in September next; besides this in the following years an eventual increase may take place, regulated according to certain indications of prosperity.
The Dawes plan further establishes the character of Germany's yearly payments; a certain quota is furnished by balance sheet items; a certain quota by a special tax on transportation, and finally a quota by the interest and amortization of 16 million dollar gold bonds (secured by rails and industries) purposely created by the Dawes plan.
2. During the four years which have elapsed since the adoption of the Dawes plan, Germany has met all her obligations. The State treasury has met its quota as well as the return from the transportation tax. The rail and industrial obligations have been turned over to the trustees as established by the plan, and, although they have as yet not been put on the international market, the established debt service has been regularly met. In this way the yearly payments have been met and regularly transferred to foreign treasuries. The Agent General for Reparations has regularly reported them in his annual statement, and the allied treasuries began in the year 1924 for the first time to receive the installments on the money owing to them.
In these four years, however, some transformations have taken place both in the management of the Reichsbank and in the administration of the German budget that might, if continued, seriously jeopardize the transfer and even the payment of the annual installments. On one side the German state has increased its expenditures, on the other it has increased the amount of both national and foreign loans. The German budget at the present moment (besides the contributions expected from other sources, such as interest on the obligations and tax on transportation) must contribute to the Dawes payment an amount which this year is figured at half a billion gold marks, and which from next year on will be of at least one and a quarter billion gold marks.
If also the foreign indebtedness is not contained within certain limits, a situation may be determined by which transfer of the above mentioned sums will become difficult if not impossible, and it will be even more difficult for foreign markets to absorb the rail and industrial obligations of which the offering at a future date is included in the enforcement of the Dawes plan.
The Agent General has noted these tendencies in his annual reports and has in a special notification advised the German Government of his observations and has consequently received further details and enlightenment as to the situation, as well as assurance as to their intentions of meeting the obligations assumed. The note of the Agent General is of October 20th, 1927; the answer of the German Government is of November 5th of that same year.
Just recently, in his annual report and in reference to his previous communications, Mr. Gilbert went into several details of the problem, particularly noting other incidents which might endanger the enactment of the Dawes plan, and which depend from the very nature of that plan, and these are: by establishing a system of protection for the transfer of the payments which is in the hands of a special committee the plan tends to diminish the direct responsibility of the German authorities; the uncertainty regarding the total amount of the debt tends to diminish the incentive for further economic development which ought to be in proportion to the necessary effort for meeting the total obligation.
Mr. Gilbert concludes:
"With the passing of time and experience, it becomes every day more evident that the problem of reparations as well as the other problems directly connected with it will only find a definite solution when Germany will realise the exact weight of her burden and will be put in condition to carry it on her own responsibility without foreign control and without special protection for the transfer of the payments."These conclusions caused a wide echo, many press comments and numerous declarations by political leaders. The Commission on Reparations by by whom Mr. Gilbert is appointed took special notice of the conclusions to which he arrived and a meeting with the General Agent was called and met in last January.
No new development has taken place since then, neither in the regular functioning of the plan nor in eventual agreements as to its action in the future.
The Italian standpoint in this matter is clear and well known. It is proved by a whole series of documents: diplomatic notes, public declarations, legislative provisions. It is based on the relation or rather on the interdependence of reparations and debts which is fundamental and unquestionable, so far as we are concerned. The existence of this relation between debts and reparations, which has never ceased from the time when these two problems had come face to face, was confirmed in the historical development of these two problems: the debt settlements followed immediately the fixation, though only provisional, of the German payments (Dawes Plan); the amount of Italy's payments to Great Britain and to the United States corresponds to the amount which Italy, on the basis of the agreements in force, is to receive from Germany; and these payments are guaranteed independently through the functioning of the Foreign Debt Redemption Fund.
To draw a conclusion as to the actual state of the question, one can say with certainty only that the second phase of the reparation problem is coming to an end, since the idea of the revision of the Dawes Plan has now been generally accepted. But we do not yet have sufficient data to know the date of and the manner in which the revision will be effected.
The question is exceedingly complicated. Besides the political and financial elements, which are intrinsically inherent in the problem of reparations and debts, there are considerations arising out of the problem of the Rhineland occupation and out of the effect of this occupation on the question of security.
In conclusion, I want to express my personal and my Government's opinion, that, if a way can be found to put the word "End" to the chapter of history entitled "Reparations", unquestionable relief will be brought to the economic life of Europe and of the world and a new important element for stabilizing peace will come into play.
Another problem which has lately stirred the political, diplomatic and military quarters of the world is the question of disarmament. It is necessary to recall the precedents and the background so as to understand the development of the question and see its various possibilities, as well as establish Italy's attitude in the matter which has always been clearly and admirably interpreted by Senator De Marinis, to whom I am happy to publicly express gratitude and praise.
In September 1923 the Assembly of the League of Nations recommended the adoption of a plan of mutual assistance, but it did not have the sanction of the various governments.
The plan was again brought forth at the Assembly in 1924 and with partial modifications it became the Protocol based on the three essential elements: arbitration, security, disarmament.
The year 1925 was taken up by discussions regarding the Protocol, and as it had been decided to call the convention for limitation and reduction of armaments only after its adoption, the preparatory work of the conference suffered a delay during this entire period.
Once the Protocol had been dismissed the work of the Convention failed to have any purpose and the Assembly was called in 1925 and asked to give new directives.
The Assembly taking as its starting point the treaties of Locarno, which were being discussed at the time, renounced the effort of seeking a general solution of the problem of security as it had been considered by the Protocol, and defined the future program by the adoption of the following formula: "Progressive disarmament in proportion to the existing conditions of general and national security".
So as to enact this program, in December 1925 the Council created the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.
This Commission with the help of numerous sub-commissions and military and technical commissions has finished a detailed study of all the problems connected with disarmament, and in March 1927, started the analysis of two convention plans, one from England presented by Lord Cecil and a French plan sponsored by Paul Boncour.
The Commission endeavored to adopt a single plan which would furnish a basis for a second revision, but was unable to secure unanimous support and had therefore to be satisfied with submitting a tentative plan consisting of the single plan presented with all the alterations and reservations introduced by the various delegations for the majority of articles. While it is somewhat generally stated that the plan was approved as read, in reality far more than the above stated approval, it reveals the very serious divergencies on mostly all the essential aspects of the problem of disarmament.
The Session of March-April 1927, adjourned with the resolution to only have the second reading take place after the the governments of the major powers had come to an agreement as to the proportion of their respective armaments. The Assembly of 1927 was therefore convened at a moment in which the problem of disarmament was presented in all its complexity as had been revealed by the difficulties encountered by the Preparatory Commission and by the recent failure of the Conference on Naval Disarmament. In the effort of overcoming this deadlock, the Assembly concluded that the question of disarmament is intimately connected with the question of security, while the latter is in its turn related with the principle of arbitration, therefore, the Preparatory Commission was invited to form a special committee for the study of the methods of giving every State the necessary assurances of arbitration and security which could consequently bring about the adoption of an international agreement to establish the limitation of armaments at the lowest possible figure.
At the end of November 1927, the Preparatory Commission held its fourth session so as to further the resolution of the Assembly. For the first time the delegates of the Soviet Government partook in this meeting.
The principal highlights of the November session were as follows:
1. Presentation of the Russian plan for general and immediate disarmament (the Soviet Government excludes the possibility of an agreement for a partial reduction, because it believes that the different States will never be able to agree on the degree of security sufficient for a reduction in their armaments).
2. The difference between the French and the German attitudes, the former wanting to make disarmament subordinate to security, the latter wanting disarmament to derive from the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.
On February 20th the Committee on Arbitration and Security met and elaborated several types of treaties of arbitration and conciliation, of non-aggression and mutual guaranty which the committee suggests as model for adoption by various groups of states.
The greater number of these models have little but a theoretical and scientific interest. A certain political interest instead can be found in the Regional Treaty of Security (which is somewhat similar to the treaty of Locarno) which — and also according to the representatives of the Little Entente — serves as a model for joint treaties of security in the regions of the Danube and the Balkans.
The last meeting of the Preparatory Commission took place during the second half of last March. Its entirely negative results are well known.
The Commission started by discussing the Russian suggestion for integral disarmament. Except for the favourable vote of the German delegate who — for evident tactical reasons — had supported it, the other delegations were unanimous in dismissing it as non- practicable.
The Committee further discussed the possibility of having the second reading of the plan drawn up in 1927. The German delegate insisted on this point, but the majority was against him, and the Commission dissolved, and the second reading was adjourned to the discretion of the president who was authorized to call a meeting for this purpose when he thought fit.
You will recall that in the last meetings of the Committee, the German delegate, Count Bernstoff, repeatedly protested against the system of adjournment. He used very strong terms speaking of German "credit" and of the note signed by the Allies in Versailles which as yet they have not discounted.
Germany's dissatisfaction was recently expressed in equally strong terms by Mr. Stresemann. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly stated that Germany was tired of waiting, and he implied that they would bring the matter before the Assembly in September.
It is evident that for the second time the Preparatory Commission has reached a deadlock. It would be quite useless to proceed with the second reading of the treaty under present conditions, that is, before the great powers have come to an agreement on the principal points where divergencies exist.
During the recent session of the Preparatory Commission the French delegate, so as to justify the further adjournment, stated that "conversations were taking place among the interested governments from which favourable results might be expected".
A similar statement was made by the English delegate.
In reality these conversations amount to very little. We have had the recent English suggestions as to the possibility of reducing the movement and armaments of battleships and extending their service limit.
This suggestion was examined by the naval experts in Geneva and several unofficial meetings were held for the purpose of discussing it, but no conclusion was reached, as the British proposal did not appeal to either the Italian, the French, or the Japanese delegates, neither did it satisfy the Americans.
As for land armaments, the French delegate had some conversations with the Italian one and emphasized the necessity of an agreement between the two countries. However, he only touched on general principles and did not make any definite proposals.
All this, however, does not exclude the possibility, and we may even foresee that the principal powers will of their own initiative endeavor to make some progress in the matter of limitation and reduction of armaments before the Assembly meets in September.
And this, so as to be able to oppose the German theory which is based upon the following dilemma:
"Either the other powers agree to the reduction of armaments according to the obligation assumed at Versailles, or Germany must be authorized to have a proportionate amount of armaments."The position taken by the Italian delegation in regard to the problem of limitation or reduction of armaments is firmly based on several fixed principles, namely:
1. The interdependence of all kinds of armaments;
2. The proportion of armaments must not be based on the status quo;
3. The limits of Italian armaments can not be of an absolute character but must be relative to the total armaments of the other States (at parity with the most armed nations of Europe);
4. The Italian Government declares itself ready a priori to accept as the limit of its own armaments any figure whatever, even the lowest, provided it is not surpassed by another European Power;
5. The methods for determining the limitation of armaments must be of the simplest and must not imply the necessity of external control.
The attitude of the Italian delegation has been always inspired by the above-mentioned principles and the Preparatory Commission knows quite well the point of view of our Government in the matter of disarmament.
It is fitting that this standpoint should be proclaimed clearly and publicly from this tribune, for too much is said about the slight speck of Italian militarism by those who have large beams in their own eyes.
As if it were by an association of ideas, I would now like to speak of the League of Nations.
In this connection also, accusations of hostility or at least of lack of sympathy towards the League of Nations have been made against the Fascist Government. These are completely unfounded accusations and insinuations. The Italian Government does not attribute to the League of Nations — at least in the present period of history — the almost mythological virtues which some respectable idealists impute to it. But the fact that we look at the Geneva Institution with a sense of proportion, commensurate to the historic conditions in which it was created, does not signify hostility or lack of interest. The truth is that Italy participates in the League of Nations with the conviction that the League of Nations has been useful in many circumstances and may continue to be so in the future. In fact, her participation in the League of Nations is active in every field, and this is also due to the fact that she is represented in the Council of the League by your colleague, Senator Scialoja, whose character, learning, talent and personal prestige it would be superfluous to extol.
To all questions of a controversial character he has brought his universally and justly appreciated contribution. But to show the real attitude of the Fascist Government toward the League of Nations, we have three proposals which the Fascist Government has placed under the aegis of the League of Nations, namely: The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, the International Union of Assistance, the International Institute of Educational Cinematography.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law has, by virtue of the statute approved by the Council on March 15th, 1926, been inaugurated on May 30th at the beautiful historic Villa Aldobrandini.
This Institute has for its principal task the study of the means best adapted to harmonise and coordinate the private laws of the various states, and thus to prepare the way for uniform legislation in this branch of law.
The adherence of the principal States gives this Institute a special importance.
The establishment of the International Union of Assistance is due to Italian initiative, more exactly to your colleague Ciralao, and its purpose is to alleviate the sufferings of populations stricken by calamities.
And finally the Government, in compliance with the wishes expressed repeatedly at international congresses and meetings, has decided to establish in Rome the International Institute of Educational Cinematography which, like the Institute for International Private Law, will be placed under the moral patronage of the League of Nations.
[...]
Another very recent institution is the Committee for the Diffusion of Italian Culture Abroad. The spread of culture abroad is certainly a means of lasting and effective penetration. But too many institutions, too many entities, societies, public and private organizations in Italy and abroad have set this goal for themselves, with almost always inadequate means; too often then their efforts unnecessarily cumulate, or worse, cancel each other out. The new Committee must study the means to coordinate and usefully address the various initiatives and will create a permanent office with this specific task. Meanwhile, the work of the Directorate General of Italian Schools Abroad actively continues: one hundred new teachers, new elementary schools in Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, England, Morocco, Peru, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Uruguay; new middle schools or higher courses in Athens, Beirut, Corfu, Plovdiv, Porto Said; Rosario and Tangier, with an increase of about six thousand students, most of whom are foreign nationals, in the scholastic population of our schools abroad; new professorships and lectureships on Italian language and literature at the Universities of Prague, Bucharest, Cluj, Warsaw, Krakow, Budapest, Marseille and Coimbra are the comforting balance sheet of these activities.
[...]
Honourable Senators!
The length of my speech, which has perhaps overtaxed your attention, makes a rhetorical peroration unnecessary. You must have doubtless noticed that my speeches are becoming rarer and briefer. But the speech of today was a real and properly detailed account, with documents at hand — a kind of summary — of the Fascist foreign policy during the last six years. Six years full of events and responsibilities. Six years of delicate and patient work. The foreign policy of a great nation requires a continuous effort, alert watchfulness, an exact knowledge of conditions and problems. When foreign policy is spoken of, it must be borne in mind that every game is played by two or more partners, that situations are not static but always changing and that one must frequently know how to wait calmly, without excitement over success or failure, just as it now happens, for instance, that what could not be secured in 1923 we obtained in 1928. Foreign policy in peacetime is a wise preparation for situations which may develop rather slowly, and it is also the constant defence of the material and moral interests of the nation.
The new political constitution of Italy and the foreign policy of the Fascist Government have, one may say without committing the sin of excessive pride, put Italy into the forefront of the world. Many calumnies have been or are being disseminated. Though no one can swear that war has disappeared from history, Italy wants peace, but she cannot and must not neglect the armed strongholds of her unity, independence, security; she cannot give up the moral and military education of the new generation. With these motives Italy has not only — as it appears from my summary — solved many problems which concern her, but she has won a prestige in international politics which she has never had before. Her star is rising slowly on the horizon. This is, after many difficulties, the indisputable work of the Fascist regime.
Honourable Senators!
Remember and, in your sure conscience, judge!
