By Amedeo Giannini
THE PROBLEM OF ROME AS CAPITAL DURING THE PERIOD OF THE RISORGIMENTO.
The whole Italian people were agreed on the two essential problems of the Risorgimento: the one, to chase the foreigner out of Italy, and the other, to unify the country. But while they agreed without exception on the first point, on the second, opinions varied as to the means of realizing and consolidating national unity. Some recommended a federation of Italian states, while others, fearing the division of strength which would fatally result from the development of a municipal spirit, maintained that it was most important to arrive at a strictly unitary solution—to create a single and strongly centralized state. The federal solution, on its side, permitted the preservation intact of the pontifical state; and there was even a dream of having the Pope at the head of the federation. But when it became obvious that municipalism could only hinder the development of unification—which it did retard, moreover, by ten years—the federalist idea was definitely discarded. Then the vital problem asserted itself, the question of Rome, the natural capital of the Italian nation both from the moral and historical point of view.
How could a people as Catholic as the Italian recover their capital—the patrimony of the Pope—without dissensions with the Sovereign Pontiff; and how could they at the same time guarantee his independence and spiritual autonomy as head of the Catholic Church. The reply was evident: the temporal domain is not indispensable to the independence of the Pope nor to his spiritual autonomy. Even if he is not a Prince, the Pope remains a Pope.
It was clear, however, that Rome could be entered only with the as sent of the Sovereign Pontiff, or otherwise, against his opposition. Was an accord possible when neither of the two parties concerned was able to renounce Rome? And if an agreement were not possible of realization, there remained only conquest; in other words, the spoliation of the temporal patrimony of the Pope, and a gesture on Italy's part which would wound the heart of the Catholics, and which—if it became inevitable—could be made only with reluctance and remorse. There was no other way out.
On the other hand, the problem was not exclusively Italian; it was complicated by the fact that all the foreign Catholics supported the Pope and that the political interest of the Powers, especially in the case of France, was involved therein.
When Italian unity was suddenly realized in 1860, the problem of Rome took definite shape and insistently demanded solution. It was Cavour's greatest torment and he determined to embark on a policy of agreement. For this purpose, at the end of 1860 he entrusted a mission to Abate Stellardi, and later to Baron de Roussy; then in 1861 to Dr. Diomede Pantaleoni and to Padre Carlo Passaglia. Cavour had great confidence in this last attempt, minutely prepared and elaborated, and, although he was not a man to delude himself readily, he hoped that Easter of 1861 would bring the olive branch of a peace finally concluded.
Every attempt at an agreement having miscarried, Cavour changed tactics; he declared himself sharply against the concordat, and in his speeches of the 25th and 27th of February 1861 prepared himself for the struggle. But by what route should he proceed? He could not seize Rome against the general will, and therefore chose the detour of Paris. Napoleon III having refused his intercession with the Pope, Cavour formulated an arrangement with him to avoid finding himself at Rome in opposition to the Pope and in the face of the French. These negotiations ended in the signature of a formal convention (June 14, 1861), a convention which became in substance that of September 1864; just a few days before its signature, Cavour died (June 6).
His successor, Baron Ricasoli (1), wished to resume the negotiations with Paris, but on different bases. The project which he presented not having been agreed to by Napoleon III, he determined to re-enter into direct conversations with the Holy See; but he undertook the matter clumsily. After addressing a letter to the Pope in a didactic tone with practically the air of giving him a lesson, to cap the climax, he chose as intermediary Padre Passaglia, a man already compromised by a pamphlet: Pro causa italica, which qualified the temporal power of the Pope as "almost heretical."
Some years later Minghetti (2), in his desire to reach a solution, reopened conversations with Paris on the subject of the accords negotiated by Cavour during the last days of his life, and concluded the agreement known as the September Convention (September 5, 1864). By this he secured the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome; for his part, he bound Italy not to attack the city, and to transfer the capital from Turin to Florence. Bonghi (3) declared the Roman Question settled by this accord which, however, opened up a new phase of the problem, in as much as it henceforth left Italy and the Pope to face each other alone. It was then that Garibaldi intervened and opposed the Convention by his coup de main at Mentana. And the problem asserted itself with renewed acuteness up to the moment when France, occupied elsewhere by the tremendous exertion of the Franco-Prussian war, finally offered Italy the chance to settle the question.
Visconti-Venosta (4) prepared public opinion by a diplomatic note to the Powers, August 29, 1870, in which he clearly defined the attitude Italy expected to take in regard to the Pope. But Lanza (5), head of the Government at that time, refused to make use of arms without a preliminary attempt at agreement. Victor Emmanuel II personally wrote the Sovereign Pontiff a magnanimous letter which was delivered by Count Ponza of San Martino. The hostile reception accorded to this missive left no other alternative than the use of force. September 20, 1870 General Cadorna's troops took possession of Rome, and several days later the union of this city to Italy was consecrated by a plebiscite.
Conforming to the spontaneous engagement taken by Italy in Visconti-Venosta's note to the Powers, the Lanza Ministry, by the law of March 13th 1871, the Law of Guarantees - later recognized as fundamental - unilaterally regulated the juridical situation and the emolument which Italy proposed to set apart for the Holy See. As was to be expected, the Pope did not recognize this law.
The problem of the acquisition of Rome by Italy was closed. But the question of the relations between Italy and the Holy See remained, that so-called Roman Question which dragged on for almost sixty years be fore its final settlement. From the outset the problem appeared insoluble, aggravated as it was to an endemic state by a more or less violent guerilla warfare.
From an international point of view, the change which the Holy See had undergone, did not alter in any notable way its relations with the Powers. Yet after this some deemed it useless to maintain a diplomatic representative to the Pope, since he ceased to be a temporal sovereign. As to Italy's relations with the rest of the world, they were troubled but little by this event, and when the first Catholic indignation had subsided, almost all States accepted the fait accompli. The domestic situation, on the contrary, was completely upset by the open hostility between Church and State, and by the abstention of Catholics from any participation in the political life of the country.
THE HISTORIC STAGES OF THE ROMAN QUESTION.
The evolutionary stages of the Roman Question, from the taking of Rome to the Lateran Agreements, can be indicated with the following landmarks: 1870-1904 (pontificates of Pius IX and of Leo XIII), 1904-1914 (pontificate of Pius X), 1914-1918 (World War), 1918-1926 (rapprochement), 1926-1929 (negotiations). The evolution of the problem can perhaps be more easily followed tinder each pontificate.
From the taking of Rome on through the last eight years of his life, Pius IX, a sad prisoner in the Vatican, witnessed the crumbling of his concordat policy which had reached its zenith in 1860. In 1876 he saw the fall of the Right—the party responsible for the ecclesiastical legislation, so hostile to the Church, the Clergy and the religious orders, that party which had dispossessed him of his temporal power; and he saw the rise of the Jacobin Left, no less inimical and with a programme proclaimed to be definitely anti-clerical. He witnessed the demise of the Sovereign who had despoiled him, Victor Emmanuel II, whom he could not let die without the aid of religion. A few days later he died in his turn.
Leo XIII, in his long pontificate of a quarter of a century, began with a policy of rapprochement with the Central Powers, especially with the very Catholic Austria. He turned to Franz Joseph when on three occasions he meditated leaving Rome (1882, 1888, 1891), fearing for his position in Italy, not in dread of danger, but impressed by the exaggerated report of events which in themselves certainly did not merit the importance given them. He saw only with alarm the formation of the Triple Alliance, although, as it is known, no guarantee of Rome was given Italy by the Allies. After 1887, during the Rampolla (6) epoch, he turned definitely toward France, whose ambassador, Lefevre de Behaine, jealously watched the least sign of rapprochement. The pontificate of Leo XIII marked for Italy the period of Masonic strength and of anti-clerical agitation. Disturbances, more or less grave, repeated themselves constantly. Yet despite the accusation of Jacobinism, Crispi took up the policy of Cavour. Twice he exerted himself in behalf of rapprochement, in 1887 through Abate Tosti and in 1894 through General Mocenni. These attempts having failed, Crispi in his irritation set about to impair relations with the same vehemence with which he treated all problems near his heart. Thus after each repulse his reaction was marked by new legislative and administrative regulations concerning the Holy See. Leo XIII in his last years was no more successful in laying the foundation for what, in a favorable moment, might have become a possible adjustment of the Roman Question.
When he died, thirty years had elapsed since the taking of Rome; a new generation had almost entirely replaced the old, and the Italian State, now over forty years of age, had developed and consolidated, so that it no longer feared that national unity might be impaired. The Church no longer appeared to be a danger, the Clergy, no longer an enemy. In this new atmosphere Pius X, arisen from the people, quitted the apostolate to mount the throne of St. Peter. Thus he viewed Italian problems with other eyes, as did likewise the new Cardinals who had replaced the old. The younger clergy, born and brought up in a united Italy, no longer shared the passions of former days. The Italian people, on their side, were no more the same; the new generation was getting away from the atmosphere of the Risorgimento, from its enthusiasms, from its strifes, and even from its weaknesses. For this reason it is not astonishing that the Catholics, in view of the prejudices which caused their isolation, no longer wished to remain aloof from political life, but wished to take part in the electoral struggles. They hoped to prevent the troubled elements, seditious or of the Left, from ensconcing them selves in power. Pius X admitted that the non expedit had lost its rigour. At a time when electoral strife ran high, he was finally willing to permit that important agreements be made openly between the Catholics and the Government (the Gentiloni Pact). But the Government was a Liberal one and therefore could not modify the ecclesiastical legislation, which was considered the quintessence of liberalism. It shut its eyes and allowed the law to be violated; one might even say it favoured and encouraged these infractions. Secret conversations with the Vatican redoubled their intensity. But conciliation was not mentioned, for the Law of Guarantees was held as the sacred ark and symbol of wisdom itself. Yet from this time on relations were eased and became more stable. The difficulties were indirectly smoothed out by a whole system of compromises, deceptions and evasions of the law, winked at if not authorized.
Times had changed and the results were manifest. In this new atmosphere everyone, even the most responsible members of the Clergy and of the Catholic world, was able to express himself with unaccustomed liberty. Although in 1887 the good Abate Tosti was disowned for his naive pamphlet on conciliation, a " monument of Benedictine simplicity," although in 1889 the Bishop of Cremona, Monsignor Bonomelli (7) (who had already declared in a speech in 1881 that the conquest of Rome was a definite and irrevocable fact) likewise had been disavowed for his pamphlet: Roma e Italia e la reaha delle cose (in which, without evasion, he alluded to a possible solution of the Roman Question), and was forced to recant and, in the solemnity of sacerdotal ceremony, publicly retract his unpardonable audacity; yet in 1911 Cardinal Bourne was able to speak with full liberty at Newcastle. And again in 1913, during the social week in Milan, the Bishop of Udine, Monsignore Rossi, and Count Delia Torre expressed themselves freely on the possibility of solving the Roman Question, which, be it said in passing, had never ceased to inspire a literature as varied as abundant.
When the European conflict broke out in 1914 Italy turned towards war. What would happen to the Law of Guarantees and to the Holy See? Not without anxiety Pius X saw this double unknown advancing with the storm. But it was his successor who had to meet it face to face. Benedict XV at once took a rather definite stand. Mounting the pontifical throne, he renewed the protests made by his predecessors, but refused the hospitality which Spain offered him at the Escurial. The Pope is Roman and Avignon is not to be repeated! When Italy eventually entered the war, Pius X used his good offices, so far as the Italian Government permitted, to help the Law of Guarantees to triumph in its test of fire. The liberal jurists were thus once more able to praise the excellence of the law, while the Catholics on their side did not fail to point out that the law had been able to exist not on its own but because of the conciliatory attitude of the parties concerned.
The state of affairs created by Pius X developed under Benedict XV during the World War. The Catholics then arose to power. The clergy, Italians with the rest, did their duty at the front and behind the lines. Relations between the Holy See and the Government, though always indirect, became necessarily more frequent, and were entrusted to Baron Monti, administrator general of the fund for public worship and formerly associated with the Pope. Ecclesiastical legislation itself experienced modification in its practical applications. On the State budget appeared appropriations for the secular clergy, and others for the needs of public worship—sums which increased progressively. The status of the fund for public worship, passive and temporary originally, assumed more and more an active function, while maintaining a provisory character.
In these same years, in that Germany which from the Bismarckian epoch had more than once dangled the scare-crow of the Roman Question before Italy's eyes, there gradually took shape an important campaign in favour of the Pope. Since the Roman Question would have to be taken up at the end of the war, various plans were elaborated. Catholics (Ehrle, since become a Cardinal), Jews and Protestants (Leband, Kohler), historians (Wermingof), jurists of repute (von Liszt, von Stengel, Bornak), and even Erzberger, officially, collaborated in these projects. Between 1915 and 1917 the literature of the Central Powers flourished, culminating in the colossal work of Bastgen: Die romische Frage, 1917-1919, (about 2000 compact pages). However, the Holy See had already taken a definite stand when in an interview, July 28th, 1915, Cardinal Gasparri (8) declared that the Holy See "was awaiting the suitable solution of its position, not by foreign arms, but by the triumph of the sentiments of justice which it hoped would be more and more diffused throughout the Italian nation, in conformity with its true interest."
When peace came, the Vatican was excluded from the negotiations at Paris, not by virtue of the Pact of London—which, however, had given rise to a lively debate in the Italian Parliament at the time of its revelation by the Pravda—but because of the unanimous decision that only the belligerents should participate in those negotiations. At this time the first (secret) attempt to arrive at a solution of the Roman Question was made through private conversations between Orlando (9) and Monsignore Ceretti (10) at Paris. From the negotiators themselves, we know today the precise terms of these conversations. Although there was a possible basis for understanding, Orlando judged that it was not yet time to bring matters to a decision. In fact, to solve so grave a problem, he deemed necessary a strong Government and a people who would give support, while at that time the Government was far from strong, and the Italian people were enervated by the after-effects of the war and the disillusionments of the peace.
Nitti (11) succeeded Orlando. There were new conversations between him and Cardinal Gasparri, conversations of which we know nothing, except that they came to no conclusion.
However, in Italian political circles and in the press, a spirited agitation arose. In 1921, under the Bonomi (12) Ministry, the newspapers of the country launched an energetic campaign on the Roman Question, especially on its diplomatic aspect. A parliamentary discussion followed in which three deputies of different parties participated: Mussolini (Fascist), Rocco (13) (Nationalist), Tovini (Popular).
During the ministries of Giolitti (14) and de Facta (15) the question made no progress. It was known to all that Giolitti conceived the relations between Church and State as a system of parallels which could meet only in infinity.
However that may be, from this time on the problem was ripe and could be solved by a strong Government in a regenerated country.
THE 1925 PROJECT.
That is why Fascism was able to achieve the solution of the question. Once the Italian nation was back on its feet, with the remains of popular Demo-Masonry scattered and Masonry broken, and with the Catholic forces restored, Mussolini held all the trumps successfully to conclude the enterprise. But what means should he employ?
The fundamental principle of Fascist policy is the rehabilitation of the national forces, including primarily the religion of the country. Mussolini, without agreements, followed a unilateral policy in this sense, using indirect negotiations (the tradition of which was henceforth established) by the intervention of a person of trust. Thus by laws and other governmental measures there followed one by one: the granting of the Chigi Palace library to that of the Vatican, filling a serious void in the pontifical collection; the retrocession of the sacred convent of Assisi; the restoration of public worship in numerous churches and the restitution of several convents to religious orders, especially to those of the missionaries; the recognition of papal titles and decorations (these latter having already been recognized at the end of 1878 by Melegari's (16) circular, but with out a uniform criterion); the re-establishment of religious instruction in the primary schools, and the restoration of the Crucifix in educational institutions, government offices, and to Parliament; the appointment of military chaplains and religious assistance to all the Balilla (juvenile Fascist groups), the Avanguardia (groups of boys from 16 to 18), etc.
In conformity with this order of ideas, Mussolini, at the beginning of 1924 invited the Minister of Justice to form a mixed commission, with a view to studying a reform of ecclesiastical legislation, which, since it was drawn up between 1850 and 1873 under the stress of political preoccupations that no longer exist, had ceased to meet the exigencies of the times. Sig. Oviglio let matters lag, and it was only during his last days in office that, at the repeated invitations of the Head of the Government, he set about forming the commission. This commission, however, was nominated and installed by Rocco. Three eminent prelates, authorized by their superiors, took part in the work. Under the presidency of the under-Secretary of Justice, the commission (rapporteur Sig. Giannini) sat for ten months without interruption and, in spite of sceptics, drew up two bills of law which met with the most lively approval. Shortly after their publication, the Osservatore Romano (January 11th and 12th 1926) in a semi-official note was able to indicate in these terms the true road to religious peace: "...For that, it would be advisable, once the Law of Guarantees is abolished - that so-called masterpiece of liberalism - to assure to the Holy See the position of full and entire liberty, both ap parent and effective, to which it has an undeniable right; then after a preliminary accord between the two parties, to proceed to the reform of all unjust laws."
A month later (February 23rd), before the deluge of comments and polemics, the Pope himself stated his position in a letter addressed to Cardinal Gasparri. From this it may be concluded:
1. that the Holy See believed a change of method essential;Some days later the Minister of Justice, Sig. Rocco, in a speech in the Chamber, let it be understood that the Government saw no objection to a change of method.
2. that to obtain religious peace the three following points must be solved:
a) the abolition of the Law of Guarantees;
b) the assurance of apparent and effective independence to the Holy See, by a territorial arrangement;
c) along with the political accord, the formulation of a concordat which would serve as a basis for new Italian ecclesiastical legislation.
THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1926 TO 1929 AND THE LATERAN AGREEMENTS.
From the first weeks of 1924, conversations were held between two high personages of the two Roman worlds, with a view to finding a basis of understanding, but without results. Shortly after Rocco's speech, in 1926, new negotiations were undertaken by the two parties through two confidential representatives, at first with a purely private character but later, officially. Various circumstances prevented the opening of official conversations before the end of 1928. Mussolini negotiated these in person in the early weeks of 1929, and about a month later the agreements were concluded. The Holy See officially announced these negotiations to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to it, and on the 11th of February signatures were attached by Mussolini and Cardinal Gasparri at the Lateran Palace. Discussed and ratified by the Italian Parliament, these agreements went into effect June 11, after the solemn exchange of ratifications at the Vatican that same day. Long and labourious as the discussion had been, the conclusion was swift.
The acts signed are three in number:
a) a political treaty;
b) a financial convention;
c) a concordat.
THE POLITICAL AGREEMENT.
The most difficult problem to solve was without doubt that of the papal territory, for the sovereignty of the Pope, although of a special nature, was involved, on the one hand from the titular point of view, by the Law of Guarantees, and on the other, by tacit tradition now established. Concerning the territorial limits, the claims of the Holy See had passed through several phases since 1870 in the endeavour to reach a practical arrangement. Successively, the dream of a complete restoration, the idea of the restoration of Rome alone, then merely the Leonine City, had been abandoned. In this way the official and semi-official projects of the last years had been limited to a territorial area scarcely passing beyond the walls of the Vatican and to a corridor of land serving to link the Vatican to Civita-Vecchia, a strip restricted to the minimum indispensable for direct communication between the sea and pontifical territory. This last solution, hardly possible because the land would come from Italian sovereignty and would raise an obstacle to communications between northern and southern Italy, was likewise abandoned. There was then the question of seeing whether the territory of the Vatican, as it was constituted January 1st, 1919, could be aggrandized, and in what way. To give it greater compass there was some thought of uniting to it the Doria-Pamphily Villa, but finally it was reduced to the small area provided in the Lateran Agreements; small in its extent, but great morally, and great also by reason of the treasures there accumulated. To arrange the matter of the offices of the Vatican and other dependencies of the Holy See scattered through out the city of Rome—such as the Palace of Castel Gandolfo, already assigned to the Papacy by the Law of Guarantees—all pontifical buildings and palaces were classed in two categories: the first comprises those buildings and palaces directly controlled by the Holy See, and to those a regime of extra-territoriality is guaranteed; as to the other dependencies, assurance alone is given that they will never be submitted to charges or expropriations of public utility without previous agreement with the Holy See, and without being exempted from all ordinary or extraordinary imposts either of the State or of any other public body.
The territory of the Vatican having become a true sovereign state under the name of the Vatican City, a new problem presented itself: granted that the sovereignty of the City is entire and free from all interference by the Italian State, what regulations should be made regarding the population domiciled within its territory? A Vatican nationality was therefore provided for. This nationality is limited to persons residing permanently in the Vatican City, and ample facilities are offered for those who desire to resume their Italian nationality when they cease to inhabit papal territory.
The Holy See may legislate freely within its own boundaries, where its jurisdication is full and complete; but in order not to burden the Supreme Pontiff with the cares of jurisdiction, especially in criminal matters, ingenious provisions are made, permitting the Holy See to turn such matters over to the Italian State.
Other provisions are taken entirely from the Law of Guarantees, such as the active and passive right of legations, the sacred and inviolable character of the Pope's person and all consequences deriving therefrom, etc.
Certain provisions deserve a special mention, as that of the first article, which serves as an introduction to the agreements and repeats the beginning of the first article of the Statute of the Realm, declaring that the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is the sole religion of the State; likewise that of article 2, which defined the international position of the Pope in his relations with Italy, thereby establishing that Italy recognizes the international sovereignty of the Holy See as an at tribute inherent in its nature and in the necessities of its mission in the world.
The accord is based on the formal abrogation of the Law of Guarantees; the Pope acknowledges that the agreements assure him adequate facilities for the pastoral direction of the diocese of Rome and of the Catholic Church of the world, with all requisite liberty and independence. It declares the Roman Question definitely and irrevocably solved and so eliminated, and recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as its capital. On its part, Italy recognizes the State of the Vatican City under the sovereignty of the Pope.
From this brief sketch we see that the fundamental clauses of the treaty completely satisfy two of the essential conditions laid down by the Holy See for the re-establishment of religious peace in Italy, namely: the abolition of the Law of Guarantees, and the recognition of the apparent and effective independence of the Supreme Pontiff, as temporal sovereign, in the true significance of the term, and enjoying full and absolute sovereignty. Thus a new little State was created in the very heart of Rome, independent, and placed on an equal footing with the Kingdom of Italy, and likewise completely and absolutely sovereign over its own territory.
THE FINANCIAL CONVENTION.
The financial convention, closely associated with the political accord (article 25) liquidates Italy's debt (resulting from the events of 1870) to the Holy See, of a sum of 750 millions and of a billion of Italian consolidated stock at five per cent to the bearer (face value). We mention the preamble for its moral im portance. In effect it takes account not only of the severe damages sustained by the Holy See following the loss of the patrimony of St. Peter and of the goods of the ecclesiastical communities, as well as of the ever-increasing needs of the Church in Rome and elsewhere, but also of the financial status of the Italian State and of the economic condition of the nation after the War. That is why the indemnity was limited to what was strictly indispensable.
THE CONCORDAT.
The Concordat between Italy and the Holy See is the necessary complement of the political accord, and regulates the position of religion and of the Church in Italy.
At the same time when the Ministerial commission of 1925 was preparing the reform of ecclesiastical legislation, although it had resolved to consider all the problems, it was constantly confronted with grave difficulties resulting from the absence of collaboration between the two parties. On the one hand, this weakened the settlements proposed, and on the other, rendered obvious the need of reaching a concordat solution. In fact, if the plan of the commission had become law, although admit ting the limits imposed by its unilateral character as a law enacted by the Italian State alone, it would have been necessary to establish between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities a system of cooperation presupposing continued if not daily relations, while no official relations could exist between the Church and State. It was thought, for example, that in order to introduce into Italian legislation the system of nihil obstat in the nominations of the major benefices, it was essential to have recourse to various expedients and to follow an indirect route in regulating preliminary agreements between the State and the Holy See. Thus the projected law, based on the principle of cooperation between, the civil and ecclesiastical authorities could not fail to be altered and limited by the absence of a concordat foundation. Therefore, although certain criticisms of the project seemed justified, nevertheless it provided the definite impulse for a direct understanding with the Holy See, since it had proved that any reform of Italian ecclesiastical legislation in conformity with existing needs, was impossible without proceeding in harmony with the Holy See. Conversely, it goes without saying that the Concordat has for its point of departure, an understanding between the two authorities; and for its fundamental principle, cooperation between Church and State. Without stopping here to make a minute analysis of the Concordat, we shall limit ourselves to stating two facts:
1. that the labours of the Ministerial commission, a mixed commission with three eminent prelates sitting on it, as we have indicated, had already prepared the ground and facilitated the conclusion of the Concordat;
2. that the Italian Concordat, from more than one point of view, follows the plan of the Papal concordat policy, as I have shown in my work: I concordati postbellici (Milan, 1929), and is rather similar to the concordats concluded by the Holy See with Poland and Lithuania, both Catholic countries and by tradition ultra-Catholic like Italy. But in the Italian concordat all the provisions are treated with a breadth of view that is the direct opposite of the liberal legislation of the historic Right, as we have shown above. The Concordat not only settles these problems in a precise fashion, but, moreover, it lays down the principles by which Italian ecclesiastical legislation must be guided in its future enactments. Furthermore, the unilateral regulations of the Italian State can be promulgated only after agreement with the Holy See. Thus all Italian ecclesiastical legislation will be reinvigorated by the combined effect of the Lateran accords together with the legislation necessary for their execution and application. It would perhaps be interesting to note that the Italian Government has profited by these agreements with the Holy See to radically transform the legislation concerning the other religions practiced in the State, and these will therefore be able to develop fully under the guarantee of the Statute and of special laws.
Only one of these provisions of the Concordat deserves mention here, that concerning marriage. In the majority of faiths, marriage is a sacrament, the magnum sacramentum of St. Paul, and as such the Catholic Church views it. The Concordat and the Italian laws have recognized marriage as a sacrament for Catholics as well as for those who belong to other creeds. The latter, however, are free to contract only the civil marriage.
CONCLUSION.
The most complete secrecy was observed in the negotiations which preceded the Lateran Agreements. There were many in Italy, as well as abroad, who up to the last minute doubted the possibility of reaching an understanding. Even when the affixing of the signatures was announced, or to be more exact, when it was made known to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See that the negotiations had come to a conclusion, that unexpected news aroused a lively and pro found emotion both in Italy and throughout the rest of the world. Abroad, every State, even those of strictly Catholic tradition, appreciated these agreements according to its own interests. In Italy, all Catholics rejoiced and saw in the conclusion of this accord one of Mussolini's most significant gestures. However, as the first enthusiasm died down, criticisms arose, but not openly. It is interesting to see from what quarters these took birth. It goes without saying that neither the Masons, nor the democratic or Jacobin parties, nor their survivors or isolated representatives, were pleased. But other sections equally deplored these agreements; the Liberals, for example, with infinite grief saw the fall of that Law of Guarantees which they considered the monument par excellence of liberal juridical wisdom; they forgot that every legal monument has an historical function and that this function does not last for ever. Lastly, and this does not lack piquancy, certain Catholic circles of priests and of laymen, accustomed to the balance established for more than half a century from the taking of Rome and the application of the Law of Guarantees, were likewise dissatisfied and surveyed with suspicions the novus ordo which was just established so suddenly.
In reality, in the mind of Mussolini, the ecclesiastical reform of 1924 was to serve as a preliminary step towards conciliation and towards concordat legislation, and he had conducted it with great political prudence. But, necessarily, all Fascist enterprises assume a form of revolutionary realization. It is thus that the whole structure of ecclesiastical legislation, patiently built up during almost eighty years, was overturned in a few months, and was replaced forthwith by an ecclesiastical legislation ab imis. It is natural that those who have not been able to follow with sufficient flexibility the accelerated rhythm of the development of Italian life, have remained perplexed and astonished.
It is therefore necessary to consider this great historic event—for the conciliation can be truly placed among the great historic events of modern times—with serenity, and it must not be forgotten that when an equilibrium is broken and a new regime takes its place, whatever be the skill and the care which has been taken to work out and settle all details, certain difficulties, more or less grave, are bound to arise. But balance is found with time; is it not true that the Law of Guarantees took half a century to find its poise? And so, the Italian people, in their great majority, have seen in this Conciliation the definite consecration of Rome as capital of Italy and in the installation of religious peace, the realization of a prophetic dream, the torment of two generations.
Footnotes
(1) Baron Bettino Ricasoli, called the "Iron Baron," head of the provisional government of Tuscany; Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Council of Ministers (1861-1862); Minister of the Interior and President of the Council of Ministers (1866-1867).
(2) Marco Minghetti, Minister of Interior in the first Ministry of the Kingdom of Italy; several times Minister of Finance and of Agriculture; President of the Council of Ministers (1873-1876).
(3) Ruggiero Bonghi, eminent statesman-philosopher, writer; Minister of Public Instruction (1874-1876).
(4) Marquis Emilio Visconti-Venosta, five times Minister of Foreign Affairs (1863-1901).
(5) Giovanni Lanza, Minister of the Interior (1864-1865); Minister of the Interior and President of the Council (1869-1873).
(6) Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro, Cardinal Secretary of State until 1903.
(7) Geremia Bonomelli wished conciliation.
(8) Pietro Gasparri, Cardinal Secretary of State until 1930.
(9) Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers; took part in the Peace Conference, with Sonnino, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
(10) Monsignore Ceretti, Papal Nuncio at Paris.
(11) Francesco Saverio Nitti, President of the Council of Ministers in 1920.
(12) Ivanoe Bonomi, President of the Council of Ministers in 1921.
(13) Alfredo Rocco, Minister of Justice since 1928.
(14) Giovanni Giolitti, several times President of the Council of Ministers.
(15) Luigi de Facta, President of the Council of Ministers in 1922.
(16) Luigi Amedeo Melegari, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1876-1878).
