By Benito Mussolini
At the first National Assembly of the Leagues of Revolutionary Action (Fasci d'Azione Rivoluzionaria), the following agenda was voted on in regards to the question of irredentism:
"The National Congress of Revolutionary Interventionists, discussing irredentism, believes that the problems of nationality must be radically resolved also for ideal reasons of justice and freedom for which the subject peoples must acquire the right to belong to those collectivities from which they are sprouted, also because the resolution of these problems is in the interest of the social revolution insofar as it clears the path from any element of confusion between the various social classes."This order of the day is a declaration of principle that falls perfectly within the orbit of socialist idealities, but abstracts from it any practical or territorial delimitation of Italian irredentism. Italian irredentism is not specified and determined. Remember that during the gathering two currents emerged: one that wanted to limit itself to an ideal affirmation, the other that wanted — in addition to an ideal affirmation — to specify the meaning and scope of Italian irredentism in a geographical and historical and therefore political sense. I supported this latter category of ideas.
"It is fine" — I thought and I still think — "to affirm that problems of nationality must be solved for ideal reasons, for justice and freedom", but that is not enough. The problem presents itself in concrete terms. Our "irredentism" does not cross certain boundaries, which for other irredentists do not exist. Irredentism can slip into imperialist nationalism. How far does our "irredentism" go? Here is the question I posed to the "Fascists" summoned at Milan. A question that had no answer, but which is very topical today, due to the controversy over possession of the Dalmatian coast. If we do not want to be confused with the nationalists, if we do not want to take on positive or negative responsibilities, then we need to put forward our own point of view.
The polemics over the Dalmatian question are not "academic" as they say. They are too passionate. Nor are they premature. We need the regime of neutrality — at least — to discuss and evaluate the problems which the war will have to solve! About the possession of Dalmatia, two theses are in open contrast: the Russian thesis or, rather, the Pan-Slavist thesis, which would like to assign the entire Dalmatian coast to the Greater Serbia of tomorrow; and the thesis of the Italian nationalists who claim for Italy the domination of the whole Dalmatian coast. We are neither one nor the other. That Serbia has the right of access to the sea, nobody will dispute. Serbia yearns for the sea. It was not for nothing that the Serbian knights galloped their horses into the Adriatic when they arrived there, after a week of forced marches.
Denying Serbia the sea would be an act of arrogance, an absolutely unpolitical act that would have very damaging consequences for Italy. Having liquidated one enemy, Austria-Hungary, we would immediately create another. When it is said that Serbia has a right to the sea, what we mean is that Serbia must have a portion of the sea coast sufficient for the needs of its present and future economy.
The arguments that the Italian nationalists bring forth to block Serbia from the Dalmatian Adriatic are not convincing to us. The arguments of military nature are unrealistic. It will be a long time before Serbia — exhausted from three wars — can afford the luxury of building any kind of effictive navy.
On the other hand, in an eventual Italian-Serbian treaty of agreement, it could be stipulated that Serbia would be obliged to not create a navy. Of course, such an imposition — which would convert the Adriatic into an exclusively Italian "military lake" — should be adequately compensated. In any case, the more or less wide presence of Serbia on the Adriatic should not arouse military concerns.
There remains then the question of Italianity. This is a delicate and controversial subject. Authors are cited, the histories of Rome and Venice are consulted, geologists are even invoked, to attest whether or not Dalmatia is Italian. It is necessary to proceed here with discretion and restraint, keeping our distance from dangerous imperialist infatuations. The 'hunger for square kilometres' has already given us unpleasant surprises. Let's take advantage of the hard experience of the past, so as not to fall back into temptation and error.
It is true that the Italians in Dalmatia represent more than the mere 3% expressed in the highly-manipulated Austrian census, but the higher percentage of Italians is not, in itself, sufficient to claim exclusive possession of all of Dalmatia.
What would we say if the Germans claimed dominion over the whole of Veneto, just because there are small pockets of German-speaking populations who for centuries have lived in the plateau of the Seven Communes? And why — if the principle that everything that geographically belongs to Italy must "politically" belong to Italy holds true — why do we not also fight against England and France for Malta and Corsica?
Like all principles, that of nationality should not be understood and practiced in an 'absolute' sense but in a relative one. For this reason we cannot expect to annex the 'whole' of Dalmatia just because the people on the coast speak Italian, especially if such an annexation were to create a state of enmity between Italy and Serbia and thus the Slavic world.
Should we therefore sacrifice the surviving Italian spirit of Dalmatia and forever abandon to rampant Slavicization those cities dear to the heart of every Italian like Zara, Sebenico, Spalato and Ragusa?
No! On the contrary! We believe that its Italian culture must be saved and safeguarded. But to do this is it necessary to 'conquer' Dalmatia militarily and politically? We think not, at least not until the contrary is proven.
We think that the linguistic and cultural Italianity of Dalmatia can and should be guaranteed and preserved by a peaceful and open agreement between Italy and Serbia. If for reasons of a strategic nature this agreement also leads to a more or less extensive possession of the Dalmatian coast and archipelago by Italy, there is nothing to object to, especially with regard to the archipelago; but if, by this possession, we were to create a Serbo-Croatian irredentism and arouse the hostility of the Slavs in the Dalmatian hinterland and — more importantly! — in the Istrian hinterland, it would be better to forego it and to limit ourselves to demanding from Serbia the defense of Italian culture in Dalmatia from the assaults of a forced Slavicization by the government.
Our point of view is this: the possession of Dalmatia (archipelago and coast) must be the subject of negotiations and an Italian-Serbian agreement. Such an agreement is very plausible if the two extreme theses are avoided: the Pan-Slavist one and the Nationalist one. The Italian cities of the Dalmatian coast must constitute the support points for our future penetration and economic and cultural expansion into Greater Serbia and the Balkans. But to achieve these objectives, to make the Balkans an outlet and a market for Italian industry, it is necessary to follow a firm and fair policy; one which is neither weak nor oppressive.
